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This paper presents what was originally an Internal Research Memorandum to 
inform the Commission about the methodological underpinnings of The Stern 
Review.  
However, with recent policy initiatives in Australia, including the review headed by 
Professor Ross Garnaut, it became evident that there were benefits in making the 
work more generally available in a published Staff Working Paper. The paper 
benefited from feedback received at two Productivity Commission seminars. 
The authors acknowledge the constructive comments made by Dean Parham 
throughout the course of preparing the initial memorandum. Thanks are also due to 
Neil Byron, Bernie Wonder, Jonathan Pincus, Michael Kirby, Mark Harrison and 
Greg Murtough for their comments.  
The views expressed in this paper remain those of the authors and do not 
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‘The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change’, released in October 2006, 
immediately captured the attention of governments, policymakers and the public. 
Not only has the Review had a profound impact of itself, its proximity to the 
subsequent roll-out of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 
fourth assessment report further fuelled calls for strong collective and national 
action to address climate change.  
The Review’s central message is that climate change is a serious threat to human 
welfare that demands urgent global action now. It warns that climate change has the 
potential to lead to major economic and social disruption — on a scale similar to the 
world wars and the great depression — later in this century and beyond. The 
Review contends that:  
• the costs of climate change will be equivalent to losing between 5 per cent and 
20 per cent of global GDP each year, now and forever  
• the costs of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to avoid the worst 
climate change impacts could be limited to 1 per cent of global GDP each year. 
The Review’s estimates of future economic damages are substantially higher, and 
its abatement costs lower, than most earlier studies. In contrast to the Review’s call 
for immediate action, earlier studies generally had concluded that optimal policy 
responses involve modest reductions in GHG emissions in the near term with 
subsequent sharper reductions in the longer term. Stern (in a postscript to the 
Review) identified four key differences between his approach and that of other 
studies. Specifically, the Review:  
1. Draws on recent science which points to ‘significant risks of temperature 
increases above 5°C under business-as-usual by the early part of the next 
century’ — other studies typically have focused on increases of 2–3°C. 
2. Treats aversion to risk explicitly. 
3. Adopts low pure time discount rates to give future generations equal weight. 
4. Takes account of the disproportionate impacts on poor regions. 
The Review provides a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the costs and 
benefits of taking action (or failing to take action) to reduce GHG emissions. 
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Conventional economic analysis lies at its heart, guided by assumptions and 
methodologies that reflect the authors’ views about the need to avert the risk of 
worse than expected outcomes — climatic catastrophes at the tail of the probability 
distribution. Indeed, the prospect of higher than expected temperature rises appears 
to condition the Review’s approach to (1) risk aversion, (2) the choice of discount 
rates and (3) its judgements about appropriate equity weightings. The choice of 
discount rates, however, is the prime reason why the Review’s estimates diverge 
from those of other studies. 
The Review’s ‘urgent’ language can be explained by it being as much an exercise in 
advocacy as it is an economic analysis of climate change. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that reaction to it has been mixed. It has been: 
• hailed as establishing the case for strong action now to reduce GHGs 
• welcomed for identifying the need for action but criticised for overstating the 
case for a strong, immediate response 
• disparaged as an alarmist polemic based on extreme positions on critical 
economic parameters. 
Among these divergent views, however, is general agreement about the analytical 
challenges posed by the pervasive scientific, economic and geo-political 
uncertainties associated with climate change. Rarely do analysts confront cost–
benefit analyses with dimensions so long-term, uncertain and non-marginal. This 
places extraordinary strains on analytical techniques that generally have been 
devised for more conventional projects, and almost inevitably means that value 
judgements and ethical perspectives become more prominent. 
The foundation — Stern and the climate change science 
The Review simulates temperature estimates for ‘baseline’ climate and ‘high’ 
climate scenarios, with the latter aiming to capture effects if temperature is pushed 
higher by amplifying feedbacks — such as weakened carbon sinks and increases in 
natural methane releases. For the baseline scenario, the Review estimates that the 
global average temperature will increase between 2.4 and 5.8ºC by 2100, relative to 
the pre-industrial era (90 per cent probability). The estimate for the high scenario is 
2.6–6.5ºC.  
It is informative to compare the Review’s estimates with those subsequently 
projected by the IPCC. While the IPCC provides projections for six ‘emissions 
marker scenarios’ (noting that all are equally valid), the Review’s projections for 




both its baseline and high climates are based on one scenario — which is associated 
with high range GHG emissions.  
The Review’s temperature projections are consistent with those of the IPCC’s high 
emissions marker scenarios, but higher than the IPCC’s other scenarios. 
Notwithstanding this consistency, the Review tends to lead with headline messages 
that incorporate lower probability outcomes and hence it elevates more adverse 
climate change consequences than does the IPCC. For example, the first chapter of 
the Review asserts that if annual GHG emissions remain at current levels until 
2100, the world will be committed to warming of 3–10°C — the upper end of which 
is well outside the ‘likely’ range in the IPCC’s fourth assessment report.  
Estimating climate change damage costs 
The Review’s approach to analysing the impacts of climate change is twofold.  
1. It engages in a lengthy qualitative discussion of the impacts of climate change on 
water availability, sea levels, biodiversity, food production and human health. 
No monetary values are ascribed to impacts in this bottom-up analysis.  
2. Overall damage estimates are derived using an Integrated Assessment Model, 
PAGE2002. The model deals with uncertainty through a ‘Monte Carlo’ 
simulation. Each scenario is run 1000 times with parameters chosen at random 
from the ranges given in the climate change literature, yielding a probability 
distribution of damage cost estimates (GDP losses).  
In relation to the bottom-up analysis, the literature on the impacts of climate change 
varies widely. For example, some emphasise the beneficial impacts for some 
regions (for example, through the carbon fertilisation effect), although such benefits 
are expected to dissipate at higher temperatures. Although the Review 
acknowledges the controversies and uncertainties of impact assessments, it draws 
heavily on studies that have a more pessimistic view on climate change and its 
impacts, and gives little attention to more optimistic views. 
The damage cost estimates assume that developing countries continue to have an 
elevated vulnerability to climate change damage even after per capita incomes 
increase substantially. That is, it does not systematically take into account the 
potential of adaptation measures to reduce damages and of social and economic 
development to reduce vulnerability to climate change. The estimates are also based 
on population growth projections that are much higher than those of leading bodies, 
such as the United Nations.  
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Accordingly, the Review’s results are at the upper end of the range of the literature. 
Apart from any tendency to draw on the more pessimistic damages literature, 
another reason for this is methodological. The Review attempts a more complete 
coverage of damage costs than most previous studies, which have tended to confine 
analysis to market impacts only. The Review incorporates non-market costs — 
which is methodologically sound but relies on ‘rough and ready’ estimates — and 
also the risk of abrupt, large-scale climate change. Appropriately, in the main body 
of the report at least, the Review presents the results for these impact categories 
separately, thereby arming decision makers with information to take account of the 
respective uncertainties. 
The Review estimates the mean damage costs (for the low estimate), including the 
risk of catastrophe, at 5.3 per cent of global GDP in 2200, with a 10 per cent 
probability that damage costs are either less than 1 per cent or over 12 per cent of 
GDP (figure 1 [a]). The low estimate is based on the middle set of impact categories 
(market impacts plus the risk of catastrophe) and the baseline climate scenario.  
Figure 1 Damage costs 
Panel [a] low estimate                                         Panel [b] high estimate 
Source: Stern (2006). 
Adding non-market impacts and changing to the high climate scenario yields a high 
estimate of damage costs with a mean of 13.8 per cent of GDP in 2200 (figure 1 [b]) 
and a correspondingly higher range of uncertainty. 
Estimating climate change mitigation costs 
In the climate change literature, two basic approaches are used to estimate 
mitigation costs: resource costs and macroeconomic modelling. The resource cost 
approach uses costs of individual emission-saving measures to estimate mitigation 
costs — a ‘bottom-up’ approach. Macroeconomic modelling of mitigation explores 




the economywide effects of the transition to a lower emissions economy — a 
‘top-down’ approach. The Review pursues both approaches. 
The resource cost estimate carries a large degree of uncertainty and this is 
acknowledged. For the central estimate of mitigation costs of 1 per cent of GDP, a 
range from -1 per cent to 3.5 per cent is given. This reflects the sensitivity of the 
estimates to assumptions about technological change.  
The Review claims that the resource cost estimate is an upper bound estimate of 
costs. This is not necessarily the case because other effects, such as feedbacks 
between the energy sector and the rest of the economy which could lead to higher 
costs, are ignored by resource cost estimates. Further, assumptions about the 
efficiency of policy and technological change may turn out to be too optimistic.  
The macroeconomic modelling estimates are based on meta-analyses of a range of 
models. The Review estimates the annual costs of stabilisation at 500–550 ppm 
carbon dioxide equivalent to be around 1 per cent of global GDP in 2050 (with a 
range of +/-3 per cent), and likely to remain around this level after 2050. This is at 
the low end of the range of estimates in the literature, largely because of a reliance 
on models that assume technological change will be induced by policy action. This 
may be theoretically sound but, in practice, is difficult to model reliably. Moreover, 
other model comparison studies suggest that costs are likely to increase as a 
proportion of GDP after 2050.  
Aggregating the damages and mitigation costs 
The Review aggregates the estimated climate change damage costs and the 
mitigation costs to give all inclusive estimates. The aggregation involves difficult 
and contentious areas such as discounting, dealing with uncertainty and weighting 
costs in poorer countries. Inevitably, ethical considerations come into the choice of 
aggregation factors for climate change and different ethical perspectives lead to 
very different results and policy prescriptions. 
Because mitigation incurs costs now for benefits that are expected mainly in the 
very long-term future, economists use discounting to bring the costs and benefits to 
a common timeframe. The choice of discount rates is critical. The Review’s 
headline conclusion that business-as-usual emissions involve costs and risks that are 
equivalent to losing 5 per cent to 20 per cent of global GDP, now and forever, is 
based on discount rates that appear to be around 1.4 per cent per annum. These low 
rates are the main reason the Review’s headline estimates of damage costs are so 
much higher than most other studies — many times higher than the estimates of 
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Nordhaus and other prominent economists. Adding 1 percentage point to the 
discount rates reduces the damage cost estimates by more than half.  
While it is not possible to say whether the Review’s approach to discounting is 
definitively right or wrong, some conclusions can be drawn:  
• The Review’s approach is based on ethical judgements about intergenerational 
equity that are not necessarily representative of wider opinion and certainly are 
different from the judgements of some other climate change analysts.  
• Under the Review’s approach, community wellbeing is said to be increased by 
forgoing current consumption in order to make climate-related investments that 
produce benefits in the long term. Whether these investments are superior to 
alternative investments is left unanswered by the analysis.  
• Basing discount rates on market interest rates, as others do, tends to guard 
against the adoption of sub-optimal investments. For some, however, the 
outcomes of this approach can raise concerns about intergenerational equity.  
• Some analysts start with the presumption that discount rates used for estimating 
the costs of climate change need to be low, because very long-term 
environmental effects should not be trivialised through strong discounting. 
However, to the extent that these concerns are valid, they are best addressed by 
varying environmental valuations over time, not by altering the discount rate.  
Regardless of the different views about discounting, the Review erred in its failure 
to present a range of results for different discount rates. Stern did provide a limited 
sensitivity analysis belatedly in a postscript to the Review, although the highest 
parameter values included equate to discount rates that are still relatively low.  
The Review also compares estimates of total damage costs with mitigation costs. 
This is not entirely appropriate. Mitigation costs should be compared with the 
damage costs they are expected to avoid to facilitate an assessment of the net 
benefits from action. However, because the difference between total and avoided 
damage costs is not large, this ‘asymmetry’ does not make a material difference to 
the Review’s conclusions. 
Climate change policy 
Based on its analysis of costs, benefits and risks, the Review calls for strong, early 
action on mitigation. It outlines three essential elements of policy for mitigation. 
• An emissions price, preferably equalised across countries, achieved through tax, 
trading or regulation. 




• Support for the development of a range of low-carbon technologies. 
• Removal of barriers to behavioural change, particularly to encourage the uptake 
of opportunities to improve energy efficiency. 
The Review is not prescriptive about the choice of policy instruments. This may 
reflect pragmatic considerations about the importance of building a coalition for 
action by not dictating options that might be politically infeasible in some countries. 
The Review places most emphasis on emissions pricing, stressing the importance of 
environmental effectiveness, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, credibility, flexibility 
and predictability.  
It acknowledges that, in the absence of any other market failures, a credible 
emissions price path should be sufficient to encourage suitable technologies. 
However, it contends that such conditions do not hold in practice for various 
reasons — for example, innovation produces public spillover benefits that may lead 
to it being undersupplied privately.  
Accordingly, the Review advocates policies to bring a portfolio of low-emission 
technologies to commercial viability. While advocating governments be cautious 
about ‘picking winners’, the Review identifies energy storage, photovoltaics, 
biofuel conversion, fusion, material science and carbon capture and storage as 
having potential. It also advances arguments for government support for 
deployment of low-emissions technologies through subsidies, quota-based schemes 
and price support mechanisms. Notwithstanding the potential for spillover benefits, 
the emphasis given to deployment support is surprising given the potential for this 
to increase mitigation costs unnecessarily.   
Further, the Review proposes that, even if emissions pricing and technology support 
measures are introduced, market imperfections may inhibit some low-cost action. 
For example, households and firms may not take up energy efficiency opportunities 
even when it would be cost effective. Proposed measures to address such barriers 
include: minimum energy performance standards and integrated land-use planning 
to reduce transport demand. 
The Review finds that preventing deforestation can be a low-cost means of reducing 
emissions. While incentives for this could be achieved within emissions trading 
markets, the Review contends that this could destabilise these markets.  
The Review acknowledges that adaptation is the only way to deal with the 
unavoidable impacts of climate change. Although it argues that mitigation and 
adaptation should go ‘hand-in-hand’, it does not discuss an integrated policy 
framework. 
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The Review does not lay out a ‘blueprint’ for collective action, but rather outlines 
desirable features for an international framework. It identifies faults of the Kyoto 
Protocol, but suggests building on this framework. It considers that the post-2012 
framework should be based around binding emissions caps for individual countries 
that can be met in part through international trading in emission permits. This 
position is not universally held. Others, for example, contend that: there should be 
no nexus between country-based caps and an overall target; international trading in 
permits is undesirable; and an internationally harmonised tax on emissions is 
preferable to a cap-and-trade architecture. 
The issue that most dominates the geo-political debate, however, is the treatment of 
developing countries. Most developing countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol 
but are not required to take on binding emissions targets. Under the Protocol’s 
Clean Development Mechanism, developed countries may earn credits towards 
meeting their targets by implementing projects in developing countries.  
The Review argues that, in the long term, developing countries must incorporate the 
externalities of using carbon into the structure of incentives in their own economies. 
However, it appears to support the continued use of the Clean Development 
Mechanism for a considerable period of time. It further suggests that if mitigation 
costs were 1 per cent of GDP, rich countries might, for equity reasons, pay 1.2 per 
cent and poorer countries 0.2 per cent in the initial decades. This could involve rich 
countries investing in emission reduction activities outside their own borders. Other 
analysts have suggested ways that developing countries could take on binding 
targets without imposing high costs in the short term. 
The Review’s contribution 
One indicator of the Review’s contribution can be gauged from the reaction of its 
staunchest critics. Initially, some critics were strident in their claims that the Review 
was a biased and alarmist polemic. More recently, some of these criticisms have 
become more muted. There appears to be an emerging view that the Review has 
made a valuable contribution by establishing climate change as an economic issue 
that can be assessed through the ‘lens’ of a cost–benefit framework. 
Moreover, the Review team continues to engage with its critics and to expose its 
work (including rebuttals of critiques) to scrutiny. In some instances, its responses 
indicate acceptance of criticisms levelled. In this respect the Review continues to be 
important as a catalyst for engendering further analysis, development and 
refinement of the economics of climate change.  




Methodologically, a strength of the Review is that it attempts to move beyond an 
analysis based on the expected (or ‘mean’) outcome to one that incorporates low 
probability, but potentially catastrophic, events at the tail of probability 
distributions. Indeed the Review is the first cost–benefit analysis of climate change 
to incorporate formally such potential outcomes in such an integrated way in its 
modelling. Also to its credit, the Review uses top-down as well as bottom-up 
estimation procedures in its derivation of damage and mitigation costs — although 
in the former case, the bottom-up approach appears to be primarily a vehicle for 
delivering selected sobering views about the potential impacts of climate change on 
human welfare.  
Some of the criticisms of the Review are justified. The assertiveness with which 
some of the headline messages are delivered is not always matched by the caution 
attached to the evidence and analysis presented within the body of the report. And, 
relevant questions remain about the way the analysis was focused. It is based on a 
single high emissions scenario, inclines towards more pessimistic assumptions on 
damage costs, and adopts unconventional parameters for discount rates. These traits 
tend to escalate the present value of future costs and thereby elicit urgency in 
mitigation measures.  
This is consistent with the Review authors’ apparent belief that, although 
catastrophic outcomes may be unlikely, the implications for future generations, 
were they to arise, would be so detrimental that it would be remiss to fail to give 
them sufficient weight. There is nothing especially wrong with this view — as one 
critic has conceded, the Review’s conclusions may well be proved right but for the 
wrong reasons. However, the Review presents itself to decision makers as yielding 
conclusions underpinned by conventional, rational economic analysis. In fact, the 
authors’ concerns about catastrophe in conjunction with their attendant ethical 
perspectives, permeate many stages of the analysis. More sensitivity analysis to 
highlight the consequences of alternative views and value judgements would have 
been valuable.   
 




The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (hereafter the Review), produced 
under the direction of the United Kingdom (UK) Cabinet Office and the UK Treasury was 
launched by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer in October 2006. The 
Review was headed by Sir Nicholas Stern, (at the time) Head of the Government 
Economic Service and Adviser to the British Government on the economics of climate 
change. The central message of the Review is that: 
… if we don’t act, the overall costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to 
losing at least 5 per cent of global GDP each year, now and forever. If a wider range of 
risks and impacts is taken into account, the estimates of damage could rise to 20 per 
cent of GDP or more. In contrast, the costs of action – reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change – can be limited to around 1 per 
cent of global GDP each year. … So prompt and strong action is clearly warranted. … 
If no action is taken to reduce emissions, the concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere could reach double its pre-industrial level as early as 2035, virtually 
committing us to a global average temperature rise of over 2°C. In the longer term, 
there would be more than a 50 per cent chance that the temperature rise would exceed 
5°C. This rise would be very dangerous indeed; it is equivalent to the change in average 
temperatures from the last ice age to today. (Stern 2007c, p.  xv–xvi) 
The Review’s estimates of economic damages from climate change are substantially 
higher, and its abatement costs lower, than those in most other studies using similar 
economic models. And, where the Review calls for strong action now, other studies 
conclude that optimal policy responses involve modest reductions in greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) in the near term with subsequent sharper reductions in the longer term — this 
approach is referred to as the ‘climate-policy ramp’ (see, for example, Nordhaus 2006b; 
Kelly and Kolstad 1999). 
1.1 Reaction to the Stern Review 
The Review received worldwide attention and has evoked strong, often polar, responses 
(box 1.1). Views and counterviews continue to be published in the popular media and in 
academic journals, eliciting further rounds of critiques and ‘postscripts’. Indeed, 
throughout 2007, the Review team continued to publish work-in-progress papers on its 
website.  
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Box 1.1 Responses to the Stern Review 
Endorsements (from Nobel Laureates in economics) 
If the world is waiting for a calm, reasonable, carefully argued approach to climate change, 
Nick Stern and his team have produced one. They outline a feasible adjustment policy at 
tolerable cost beginning now. Sooner is much better. (Robert Solow) 
The stark prospects of climate change and its mounting economic and human costs are 
clearly brought out in this searching investigation. What is particularly striking is the 
identification of ways and means of sharply minimizing these penalties through acting right 
now … The world would be foolish to neglect this … practical message. (Amartya Sen) 
The Stern Review … provides the most thorough and rigorous analysis to date of the costs 
and risks of climate change, and the costs and risks of reducing emissions. It makes clear 
that the question is not whether we can afford to act, but whether we can afford not to act. … 
it provides a comprehensive agenda — one which is economically and politically feasible —
behind which the entire world can unite … (Joseph Stiglitz) 
The Stern report shows us, with utmost clarity, while allowing fully for all the uncertainties, 
what global warming is going to mean; and what can and should be done to reduce it. It 
provides numbers for the economic impact, and for the necessary economic policies. It 
deserves the widest circulation. (James Mirrlees) 
Criticisms  
… the Stern Review is very selective in the studies it quotes on the impacts of climate 
change. The selection bias is not random, but emphasises the most pessimistic studies. … 
The report claims that a cost–benefit analysis was done, but none was carried out. The 
Stern Review can therefore be dismissed as alarmist and incompetent. (Richard Tol) 
The Review’s unambiguous conclusions about the need for extreme immediate action will 
not survive the substitution of discounting assumptions that are consistent with today’s 
market place. So the central questions about global warming policy — how much, how fast, 
and how costly — remain open. (William Nordhaus)  
The rhetoric deployed by the authors … skims over the fact that we have little intuitive feel 
for the numerical weights that should be placed on normative parameters. Where the 
modern economist is rightly hesitant, the authors of the Review are supremely confident. … 
the cause isn’t served when parameter values are so chosen that they yield desired 
answers. (Partha Dasgupta) 
… the choice of an appropriate policy toward global warming depends heavily on how one 
weighs the costs and benefits it imposes on different generations. The Stern Review chose a 
particular way to do this, but many other choices could have been examined. (Hal Varian) 
.. far from being an authoritative guide to the economics of climate change, the Review is 
deeply flawed. It does not provide a basis for informed and responsible policies. (Byatt et al.) 
Sources: Stern 2006a, Byatt et al. 2006; Dasgupta 2006; Nordhaus 2006b; Tol 2006; Varian 2006.   
 
The Review has been: 
• hailed as establishing the case for strong collective action now to reduce GHGs 
• greeted cautiously as identifying the need for action but failing to demonstrate that a 
strong, immediate response is required — the climate policy ramp debate 
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• decried as an alarmist polemic based on selective use of science and extreme positions 
on critical economic parameters. 
Some of the contention about the approach adopted in the Review centres on the way it 
seeks to account for highly uncertain, but potentially catastrophic, outcomes from climate 
change. Where there is pervasive uncertainty, standard analytical approaches are 
challenged and value judgements and ethical perspectives, often reflecting people’s degree 
of risk aversion, can come to the fore. For example:  
It seems worth a very large premium to insure ourselves against the most catastrophic 
scenarios. Denying the risk seems utterly stupid. (Carl Wunsch, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, cited in Revkin 2007) 
… climate change is real, must be faced and action taken. But the discourse of 
catastrophe is in danger of tipping society onto a negative … and reactionary trajectory. 
(Mike Hulme, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, cited in Revkin 2007) 
Such views capture the essence of policy-making under uncertainty.  
Stern Review — some context 
A key contextual issue centres on the authoritativeness of the Review. Nordhaus (2006b), 
among others, observes that the Review was published without its methods and 
assumptions being appraised by independent experts — ‘even the analysis of HM 
Government needs peer review’ (p.  5). Others dispute this claim — Anderson (2007), for 
example, notes that the Review team had exposed much of its work in public papers and 
seminars prior to publication.  
Other commentators allude to a political agenda for the Review noting that, in July 2005, 
the UK House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs released a report also 
entitled The Economics of Climate Change (House of Lords 2005). That report raised 
doubts about the rigour and objectivity of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). It contended, for example, that some of the IPCC’s emissions scenarios and 
documentation are influenced by political considerations and that positive aspects of global 
warming are downplayed. It also criticised the Kyoto Protocol for having a naive 
compliance mechanism that can only deter countries from signing up to subsequent tighter 
emissions targets. The UK Government’s response (November 2005) to the report was 
unenthusiastic. It is a matter of conjecture as to whether the UK Government’s response to 
the House of Lords report and the subsequent commissioning of the Review reflected any 
particular domestic or geo-political motivation. 
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Given the policy influence of the Review and the highly divergent views that have 
accompanied its release, this paper aims to: 
• summarise the Review’s methodology, findings and policy prescription 
• assess the quality of the economic analysis  
• position that analysis within other literature on the economics of climate change.  
1.2 A global externality  
Starting from the IPCC’s consensus position that human activity, by increasing 
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs, is contributing to climate change (see chapter 2), 
means that any resultant costs are not paid for by those who create the emissions. In this 
context, climate change is an externality associated with GHG emissions, but different to 
other externality problems in its global scale, time dimension and potentially non-marginal 
impacts. The Review contends that climate change ‘must be regarded as market failure on 
the greatest scale the world has seen’ (Stern 2007c, p. 27).  
Deconstructing elements of this externality — and the implied scientific, economic and 
geo-political uncertainties — underpins the Review’s concerns. For instance:  
• The anthropogenic contribution to climate change is a global problem: 
– all countries have emitted (stock) and continue to emit (flows) of GHGs, but with 
consequences that will not fall proportionately on them 
– addressing the problem will require a coordinated response involving sovereign 
states across the spectrum of economic development. 
• The impacts of climate change are long-term and persistent: 
– much of the stock of GHG has arisen from the economic progress of developed 
nations (rich countries), yet much of the anticipated growth in emissions in the 
future will come from countries embarking on a similar pursuit of economic 
progress (developing countries)  
– the costs will primarily be borne by future generations — a weak political 
constituency — implying a need to consider trade-offs between current 
consumption and future welfare. 
• There are pervasive uncertainties about the climate change science, compounded by 
unknown prospects of ‘worst case’ scenarios: 
– if climate change turns out to be less serious than predicted or a future technology 
can address it cost effectively, then early action could impose an unnecessarily large 
burden on near generations  
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– if action is delayed and the prognosis worsens, opportunities for adopting low-cost 
abatement measures may have passed, shifting a greater burden onto future 
generations 
– delaying action might mean that if it belatedly was determined that a low 
probability catastrophic outcome — such as a ‘runaway’ collapse of the polar ice 
sheets or extraordinary changes to ocean currents — was likely to arise, this 
discovery might be made after the critical threshold to avoid such an outcome has 
passed.  
Rarely, if ever, have analysts been confronted with a cost–benefit analysis of dimensions 
that were so vast, long-term, uncertain and so critical (potentially large-scale species 
extinction and significant human health impacts). This places extraordinary strains on 
analytical techniques that generally have been devised for smaller, more manageable 
projects. The Review adopts a position that ‘uncertainty is an argument for a more, not 
less, demanding [mitigation] goal’ (Stern 2007c, p. 318). 
Faced with pervasive uncertainties, the Review essentially arrives at a view that it is better 
to incur costs early for uncertain benefits, than to delay action until more is known, 
because the latter approach carries potential for higher (intergenerational) damage, 
adaptation and mitigation costs. This is highlighted in a postscript to the Review, where 
Stern explains that the Review:  
1. treats aversion to risk explicitly 
2. uses recent science on probabilities which points to ‘significant risks of temperature 
increases above 5°C under business-as-usual by the early part of the next century’ — 
other studies typically have focused on increases of 2–3°C 
3. adopts low pure time discount rates to give future generations equal weight  
4. takes account of the disproportionate impacts on poor regions. 
Hence, the critical factors that lead the Review’s conclusions to deviate from those of 
earlier studies are the adoption of very low discount rates (3) and the position taken on 
aversion to risk (1 and 2).  
1.3 Outline of the paper 
The science of climate change is briefly outlined in chapter 2, which discusses the climate 
change mechanism, the degree of uncertainty and some projected impacts of global 
warming. Because the science and consequent damage estimates provide the foundation on 
which the costs and benefits of business-as-usual (BAU) versus abatement responses rest, 
the chapter comments on the Review’s use of the climate change science.  
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Estimates of the costs and benefits of global warming over time are discussed in chapter 3. 
The strengths and weaknesses of the Review’s estimates and the wider literature on 
damage costs are canvassed. 
The costs of reducing GHG emissions below BAU levels are investigated in chapter  4. 
The chapter analyses the approach adopted by the Review and compares this with the 
wider literature on mitigation costs. 
Aggregation of costs and benefits is considered in chapter 5, which examines the critical 
issues of time (discounting), risk (degree of risk aversion) and equity weighting. The 
Review’s approach to aggregation is influenced strongly by ethical considerations which 
are discussed in relation to approaches taken in the wider literature.  
Climate change policy is the subject of chapter 6. It discusses policy responses for 
mitigation and adaptation and also international collective action. The Review’s position is 
compared with views from the wider policy debate.  
 
   




2 The science of climate change 
Climate science involving theory, observation, interpretation and projection provides the 
basis for estimating the impacts (damage costs) of climate change and hence, the benefits 
of avoiding climate change-related bio-physical impacts. The Review was not tasked with 
undertaking a scientific evaluation of climate change, but the manner in which it 
incorporates the science is pertinent.  
This chapter commences with an overview of the ‘greenhouse effect’ and the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC’s) appraisal of the links between 
human activity and climate change, including its fourth assessment report (IPCC 
2007a,b,c). The approach adopted in this paper is to accept the views of the IPCC as 
authoritative, while acknowledging that such views are very widely, but not universally, 
accepted.  
2.1 The greenhouse effect 
The Earth’s atmosphere is composed mainly of nitrogen, oxygen and argon — gases with 
limited interactions with incoming solar radiation and outgoing infrared radiation. Other 
gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, nitrous oxide and ozone are known as 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) because they absorb and emit infrared radiation. These GHGs 
make up less than 0.1 per cent of the dry atmosphere. The atmosphere also contains water 
vapour which is the most abundant GHG at around 3000 parts per million (ppm).  
GHGs absorb outgoing infrared radiation emitted by the Earth’s surface, the atmosphere 
and clouds, and emit infrared radiation in all directions, including back to the Earth’s 
surface. By trapping heat within the atmosphere, these gases create a natural greenhouse 
effect, part of the Earth’s energy balance, that makes the planet habitable (figure 2.1).  
The enhanced greenhouse effect 
Higher concentrations of GHGs increase the emission and absorption of infrared radiation. 
As concentrations rise, outgoing infrared radiation is reduced and the temperature of the 
surface-troposphere system increases. It is believed that the overall effect of ‘feedbacks 
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effects’ (some negative, others positive)1 is to amplify any temperature increase, but with 
uncertainty about the effect of clouds.  
Figure 2.1 The Earth’s global and mean energy balancea 
 
a Of the incoming solar radiation, 49 per cent (168Wm-2) is absorbed by the surface. That heat is returned to 
the atmosphere as sensible heat (heat that can be sensed), as evapotranspiration (latent heat) and as thermal 
infrared radiation. Most of this is absorbed by the atmosphere, which in turn emits radiation both up and down. 
The radiation lost to space comes from cloud tops and atmospheric regions much colder than the surface.  
Source: IPCC (2001c), reproduced from Kiehl and Trenberth (1997).  
The IPCC reports that atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have increased at an 
unprecedented rate since pre-industrial times and continue to rise (figure 2.2):  
Global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide have 
increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed 
pre-industrial values determined from ice cores spanning many thousands of years. 
(IPCC 2007c, p. 2) 
Changes in global average temperatures from 1850-2005 are shown in figure 2.3. The 
long-term temperature record, shown in figure 2.4, highlights the degree of volatility over 
the last 400 000 years.  
Summarising the science, it is universally accepted that since the pre-industrial era: 
• emissions and atmospheric concentrations of GHGs have increased 
• the Earth has warmed by around 0.7°C 
• human activity has contributed to higher atmospheric concentrations of GHGs. 
                                                 
1 An increase in water vapour caused by higher temperatures is a key feedback thought to amplify 
any temperature increase. The effect of increasing aerosols is not well understood but it is 
believed that, by scattering incoming solar radiation, they offset the enhanced greenhouse effect.   
   




Figure 2.2 Changes in carbon dioxide concentrationsa, b 
Based on ice core and modern data 
 
a CO2 is the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas. The atmospheric concentration of CO2 has 
increased from a pre-industrial value of about 280 parts per million (ppm) to 379 ppm in 2005. The annual CO2 
concentration growth rate from 1995–2005 averaged around 1.9 ppm per year, compared with an average of 
1.4 ppm per year for the period 1960–2005. b Radiative forcing, shown on the right axis, is a measure of the 
influence that a factor has in altering the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the Earth-atmosphere 
system and is an index of the importance of the factor as a potential climate change mechanism. 
Source: IPCC (2007c). 
Figure 2.3 Global average near surface temperatures 1850-2005 
Source: Stern (2007c). 
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Figure 2.4 Global temperature record, Vostok ice core data 
Source: McKibbin (2007). 
There is an emerging consensus that anthropogenic emissions have already caused the 
Earth to warm. In 1995, the IPCC observed that the ‘balance of evidence suggests a 
discernible human influence on global climate’ (IPCC 1995, p. 1). By 2001, it considered 
that this influence was ‘likely’ and in February 2007, reported that most of the observed 
increase in temperatures was ‘very likely’ due to increases in anthropogenic GHG 
emissions.2 
The IPCC’s probabilities for future states 
Projections of the impacts of higher atmospheric concentrations of GHGs are based on 
climate models, which approximate dynamic systems. Many climate forcings (positive and 
negative) — such as aerosols, clouds and oceans — are not well understood. As the IPCC 
noted in its third assessment report: 
In climate research and modelling, we should recognise that we are dealing with a 
coupled non-linear chaotic system, and therefore that the long-term prediction of future 
climate states is not possible. The most we can expect to achieve is the prediction of the 
probability distribution of the system’s future possible states by the generation of 
ensembles of model solutions. (IPCC 2001c, p. 774) 
As well as the scientific uncertainty, there is uncertainty about how human populations and 
economies will develop, and therefore what business-as-usual GHG emissions would be. 
                                                 
2 ‘Likely’ equates to a greater than a 66 per cent probability of occurrence and ‘very likely’ a 
greater than 90 per cent probability. These probabilities reflect a consensus judgement. The 
IPCC has two higher probability standards — ‘extremely likely’ and ‘virtually certain’ 
(IPCC 2007c). 
   




To deal with this uncertainty, the IPCC presents results for a range of ‘emissions marker 
scenarios’. These scenarios are described in box . 
 
Box 2.1 The main characteristics of the IPCC scenarios 
The IPCC has developed four scenario families (A1, A2, B1 and B2). The A1 scenario 
family contains three variants and so in total there are six emissions marker scenarios. 
The A1 scenario family describes a future world of rapid economic growth, global 
population that peaks mid-century and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of 
more efficient technologies. A major underlying theme is a substantial reduction in 
regional differences in per capita income. The A1 family includes three alternative 
directions of technological change in the energy system: fossil intensive (A1FI), 
non-fossil energy sources (A1T), or a balance across all sources (A1B) — defined as 
not relying too heavily on one particular energy source, on the assumption that similar 
improvement rates apply to all energy supply and end use technologies. 
The A2 scenario family describes a heterogeneous world of self reliance and 
preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns across regions converge very slowly, 
which results in continuously increasing population. Per capita economic growth and 
technological change are more fragmented and slower than other storylines. 
The B1 scenario family describes a convergent world with the same global population 
over time as in the A1 storyline, but with rapid change in economic structures toward a 
service and information economy, with reductions in material intensity and the 
introduction of clean and resource efficient technologies.  
In the B2 scenario family the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social and 
environmental sustainability. It is a world with continuously increasing global 
population, at a rate lower than A2, intermediate levels of economic development, and 
less rapid and more diverse technological change than in the B1 and A1 storylines. 
Source: IPCC (2000).  
 
In its most recent assessment, the IPCC reported global warming projections to 2100 for 
the various scenarios (figure 2.5). It stated:  
Best estimates and likely ranges for globally average surface air warming for six … 
emissions marker scenarios are given in this assessment … For example, the best 
estimate for the low scenario (B1) is 1.8°C (likely range is 1.1°C to 2.9°C), and the best 
estimate for the high scenario (A1FI) is 4.0°C (likely range is 2.4°C to 6.4°C). 
(IPCC 2007c, pp. 13-14) 
The IPCC further projected that, if radiative forcing were to be stabilised in 2100 at A1B 
levels, thermal expansion would lead to 0.3 to 0.8 m of sea level rise by 2300 (relative to 
1980–1999). Moreover, it stated that contraction of the Greenland ice sheet would continue 
to contribute to sea level rise after 2100. Climate models suggest that, as temperature rises, 
ice mass losses increase more rapidly than gains due to precipitation. This balance is 
thought to become negative at a global average warming (relative to pre-industrial levels) 
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in excess of 1.9 to 4.6°C. Accordingly, if a negative balance were sustained for millennia, 
the Greenland ice sheet would be eliminated, leading to a sea level rise of about 7 metres 
(IPCC 2007c).  
Figure 2.5 Multi-modal averages and assessed ranges for global warming 
a  Solid lines are multi-model global averages of surface warming (relative to 1980-99) for the scenarios A2, 
A1B and B1, shown as continuations of the 20th century simulations. Shading denotes the +/- 1 standard 
deviation range of individual model annual averages. The lower (orange) line shows concentrations held at 
year 2000 values. The bars at right indicate the best estimate (solid line within each bar) and the likely range 
assessed for the six SRES marker scenarios.  
Source: IPCC (2007c). 
It is important to recognise that in making climate projections there is a need to contend 
with uncertainty about: 
• the precise extent of the relative contributions of human activity and natural 
phenomena to warming3  
• the degree of climate sensitivity to different GHG concentrations  
• the effects of temperature changes on natural and human systems — particularly at 
regional levels 
• the timing and severity of climate change. 
Continuing research seeks to reduce uncertainty by, for instance, improving understanding 
of feedback effects.  
                                                 
3 While the IPCC (2007c) has ‘very high confidence’ that the net effect of human activity since 
1750 has been one of warming, there is a low to medium assessed level of scientific 
understanding for most anthropogenic radiative forcing components and a low level of scientific 
understanding for solar irradiance.  
   




Some of the burgeoning climate change literature suggests higher probabilities of 
catastrophic outcomes — for example, ‘tipping points’ leading to a Gulf stream collapse. 
Other literature, however, contends that the influence of GHGs on climate change is over-
emphasised. Carter et al. 2006, for example, in part 1 of the oft-cited ‘dual critique’ of the 
Review, noted that, in relation to the IPCC’s third assessment report (IPCC 2001c):  
… the IPCC still rated the ‘level of scientific understanding’ of nine out of twelve 
identified climate forcings as ‘low’ or ‘very low’, highlighted the limitations and short 
history of climate models, and recognised large uncertainties about how clouds react to 
climate forcing. Since then, major scientific papers have claimed, among other things, 
that the forcings of methane has been underestimated by almost half, that half the 
warming over the twentieth century might be explained by solar changes, that cosmic 
rays could have a large effect on climate, and that the role of aerosols is more important 
than that of greenhouse gases. (Carter et al. 2006, p. 171) 
This leads Carter et al. to conclude that the Review’s:  
… apodictic claim that ‘An overwhelming body of scientific evidence indicates that the 
Earth’s climate is rapidly changing, predominantly as a result of increases in 
greenhouse gases caused by human activities’ is without foundation. 
(Carter et al. 2006 p 173)  
Subsequent journal articles have challenged these claims (see, for example, Mitchell et al. 
2007; Arnell, Warren and Nicholls 2007; and Glikson 2007). These writers have declared 
that understanding of many of the scientific issues raised in the dual critique has improved 
since the IPCC’s third assessment report and that it is Carter et al., rather than the Review, 
that suffer from selection bias in their use of the science.  
The merit of scientific arguments that depart from the IPCC’s consensus view is a matter 
that cannot be resolved for this paper.  
2.2 Stern and the effects of anthropogenic emissions 
The Review reports that the present stock of atmospheric GHGs is equivalent to around 
430 ppm CO2 equivalent (CO2e), compared with 280 ppm before the industrial revolution. 
It notes that, if annual emissions do not increase beyond the current rate, the stock of 
GHGs would reach 550 ppm CO2e by 2050. However, because annual emissions flows are 
accelerating, the Review concludes that 550 ppm CO2e could be reached by 2035 at which 
level there is at least a 77 per cent chance, and perhaps up to a 99 per cent chance 
(depending on the climate model used) of a global average temperature rise exceeding 2°C 
relative to pre-industrial levels. 
The Review projects that under a business-as-usual scenario, the stock of GHGs could 
more than treble by the end of the century, giving at least a 50 per cent risk of exceeding 
5°C global average temperature change during the following decades. It warns that this 
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would take humanity into uncharted territory — for example, the Earth is now only around 
5°C warmer than in the last ice age.  
The Review’s estimates, using the PAGE2002 Integrated Assessment Model, are based 
only on the IPCC’s A2 emissions scenario which generates the second highest emissions 
levels of all the six IPCC scenarios (box ). The Review provides estimates for a ‘baseline 
climate’ and for a ‘high climate’ (figure 2.6). The latter is designed to capture effects if 
temperature is pushed to higher levels by amplifying feedbacks in the climate system, such 
as weakened carbon sinks and increases in natural methane releases.  
Under the baseline scenario assumptions, there is estimated to be a 90 per cent probability 
that the temperature will increase between 2.4 and 5.8ºC by 2100, relative to pre-industrial. 
The corresponding confidence interval for the high scenario is 2.6–6.5ºC.  
Figure 2.6 The Stern Review’s climate scenarios 
Source: Stern (2007c). 
As noted, the Review gives projections of temperature increases to 2100 under various 
scenarios relative to the pre-industrial era. The projections estimated subsequently in 
IPCC (2007c) (see figure 2.5) are relative to 1980-1999. After adjustments are made to 
equilibrate the IPCC’s and the Review’s projections, the projected temperature changes are 
generally consistent (table 2.1).  
   




Table 2.1 Projected global average warming and sea level rise at 2100 
IPCC 2007 and Stern Review projections 
Case Best estimate (°C) Likely range(°C) Sea level rise 
(metres) 
IPCC 2007 projections a   
— B1 scenario 1.8 1.1–2.9 0.18–0.38
— A1T scenario 2.4 1.4–3.8 0.20–0.45
— B2 scenario 2.4 1.4–3.8 0.28–0.43
— A1B scenario 2.8 1.7–4.4 0.21–0.48
— A2 scenario 3.4 2.0–5.4 0.23–0.51
— A1F1 scenario 4.0 2.4–6.4 0.26–0.59
Adjusted Stern Review projections b c   
— Baseline climate 3.4 1.9–5.3 ns
— High (baseline + positive feedbacks)  3.8 2.1–6.0 ns
a Temperature change and sea level rise at 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999. Estimates are assessed from a 
hierarchy of models. Sea level rise projections exclude future rapid dynamical changes in ice flow. b The 
Review’s ‘raw’ estimates are for mean warming in 2100 relative to pre-industrial. These have been adjusted to 
a similar basis as the IPCC’s estimates by subtracting 0.5°C for warming in the period 1850-1899 to 
1980-1999 (see IPCC 2007c, footnote 8). This still leaves a minor inconsistency — the IPCC’s 2090-2099 end 
point differs to the Review’s end point of 2100. c Likely temperature range reflects 90 per cent confidence 
interval, whereas the IPCC’s +/- 1 standard deviation equates to a 68 per cent confidence interval.  
Source:  IPCC (2007c); Stern (2007c).  
That said, chapter 1 of the Review, states:  
If annual greenhouse gas emissions remained at the current level, concentrations 
would be more than treble pre-industrial levels by 2100, committing the world to 
3–10°C warming… 
… As the world warms, the risk of abrupt and large-scale changes in the climate 
system will rise…. 
• If the Greenland or West Antarctic Ice Sheets began to melt irreversibly, the 
rate of sea level rise could more than double, committing the world to an 
eventual sea level rise of 5 – 12 m over several centuries. (Stern 2007c, p. 2) 
This is consistent with a general tendency of the Review to lead with headline messages 
that incorporate the ‘tail’ of lower probability outcomes. Hence, notwithstanding the 
similarity of the projections outlined in table 2.1, the Review elevates more adverse 
climate change consequences than does the IPCC.  
Stern Review: projected impacts of climate change 
The Review’s projected impacts of higher GHG concentrations are shown in figure 2.7. 
The top panel shows projected temperature ranges for stabilisation levels between 400 ppm 
and 750 ppm of CO2e. The solid horizontal lines show the 5–95 per cent range based on 
climate sensitivity estimates (taken from IPCC 2001c, based on Wigley and Raper 2001 
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and Murphy et al. 2004). The vertical lines indicate the mean of the 50th percentile point. 
The dashed lines show the 5–95 per cent range based on 11 recent studies (Meinshausen 
2006).  
Figure 2.7 Stabilisation levels and probability ranges for temperature rises 
 
Source: Stern (2006b). 
   




The bottom panel of figure 2.7 indicates that warming is projected to have increasingly 
severe impacts. The Review postulates: 
• rising sea levels could result in hundreds of millions of people being flooded 
• serious impacts on global food production with warming above 4°C 
• an increase in deaths from malnutrition, heat stress and vector-borne diseases such as 
malaria 
• that around 15-40 per cent of species potentially face extinction (with warming above 
2°C).  
For purposes of comparison, figure 2.8 summarises the IPCC’s assessment of the 
likelihood that:  
• trends towards more extreme events can already be observed 
• there is a human contribution to observed trends 
• future emissions are likely to contribute to further trend developments.  
While the two approaches are generally consistent qualitatively, the Review’s projections 
appear to ascribe more definitive probabilities to outcomes for certain temperature ranges.  
Damages and estimates of damage costs are the subject of the next chapter. 
2.3 Summary 
It is universally accepted that the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere is rising and 
that human activity is contributing to this rise. It has also been established that there has 
been measurable mean global warming since the 19th century. 
There is an emerging consensus that anthropogenic emissions have caused the Earth to 
warm. What is less well understood is the degree of climate sensitivity to different GHG 
concentrations and the effects of any temperature response on natural and human systems. 
Looking forward, climate models are used to generate probabilities for future states. 
The Review’s warming projections generally accord with the most recent projections of the 
IPCC. Nevertheless, the Review has a tendency to ‘headline’ higher, less certain, estimates 
of warming and sea level rise. 
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Figure 2.8 Human contribution to extreme weather events 
Source: IPCC (2007c). 
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3 Damages (and benefits) from climate 
change 
The Review examines the damages (and benefits) of climate change in two ways. 
First, the various bio-physical impacts of climate change and their effects on human 
welfare and the environment are identified. Second, an Integrated Assessment 
Model (IAM) is used to estimate overall damage costs over time.  
This approach is a conventional one. However, it is important to appreciate that the 
two exercises are largely independent. The impact analysis is based on a review of 
existing literature, complemented by supporting research commissioned for the 
Review. The modelling is based on relationships between temperature increases and 
costs given in IPCC (2001a) and estimates of temperature increases from IPCC 
(2001c) and some more recent studies. 
3.1 Impact on physical, biological and human systems 
The Review discusses the effects of climate change on water availability, food 
production, health, land and the environment, as well as the effects of extreme 
weather events and abrupt, large-scale impacts. 
The results of this impact analysis are expressed in physical units (for example, the 
amount of, or percentage change in, water runoff), as a probability of certain events 
occurring or the number of people likely to be affected. Economic valuation of the 
damages is necessary if damages are to be expressed in common units. However, no 
monetary values are reported in this section of the Review. A summary of the 
impacts discussed in the Review is given in table 3.1. 
Water availability 
The Review reports that climate change is expected to influence the distribution of 
freshwater across regions as well as its seasonal and annual variability due to 
changes in precipitation (including more droughts or floods) and the loss of glaciers 
and mountain snow which serve as freshwater reservoirs storing water in the winter  
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Water  Food  Health  Land  Environment  Abrupt and 
Large-Scale 
Impacts  
1°C Small glaciers 
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The latest science suggests that the Earth’s average temperature will rise by even more than 5 or 6°C if emissions 
continue to grow and positive feedbacks amplify the warming effect of greenhouse gases (e.g. release of carbon dioxide 
from soils or methane from permafrost). This level of global temperature rise would be equivalent to the amount of warming 
that occurred between the last [ice] age and today – and is likely to lead to major disruption and large-scale movement of 
population. Such ‘socially contingent’ effects could be catastrophic, but are currently very hard to capture with current 
models as temperatures would be so far outside human experience.  
Source:  Stern (2007c).  
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and releasing it in the summer. Less water storage may increase flood risk during 
wet seasons and threaten dry-season water supplies. 
Broadly, it is expected that differences in water availability between regions will 
become increasingly pronounced. Areas that are already relatively dry (such as the 
Mediterranean basin, parts of Southern Africa, South America and Australia) are 
anticipated to experience further decreases in water availability. In contrast, water 
availability in South Asia and parts of Northern Europe and Russia could increase. 
This view is consistent with the finding of the latest IPCC report:  
Changes in precipitation show robust large-scale patterns: precipitation generally 
increases in the tropical precipitation maxima, decreases in the subtropics and increases 
at high latitudes as a consequence of a general intensification of the global hydrological 
cycle. (IPCC 2007d, p. 89) 
Changes in precipitation and water availability can have diverse effects on human 
welfare. For instance, while an increase in water runoff may be welcome in some 
instances, it may also cause flooding, endangering lives, property, infrastructure and 
water quality.  
Sea levels 
Global warming is projected to lead to rising sea levels (see chapter 2). This could 
potentially have impacts on human and biological systems. It would increase the 
cost of coastal protection, and in the absence of adaptive measures, could increase 
coastal flooding, lead to loss of wetlands, coastal erosion, increase saltwater 
intrusion into surface and groundwater and displace people in low-lying coastal 
areas.  
The Review cites one study which estimates that between 7 and 300 million 
additional people might be flooded each year by a 20–80 cm sea level rise caused 
by 3 to 4°C of warming. (The projections of the latest Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change report (IPCC 2007c) anticipate that sea level will rise by 18 to 
59 cm by 2100.) Of course, the number of people at risk depends in part on different 
population scenarios. Upgrading coastal defences could partially offset these 
impacts, but this would, the Review argues, require substantial capital investment 
and ongoing maintenance. 
The Review emphasises that sea levels could rise much more rapidly and higher if 
the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets began to melt irreversibly. Even if this 
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were to happen over a much longer timescale of centuries, a sea level rise in the 
range of 5 to 12 m would have more drastic consequences.1  
Ecosystems and biodiversity 
Ecosystems are vulnerable to climate change, in particular if it occurs too rapidly 
for species to adapt. The Review draws on the literature to report that as little as 
1°C of warming could lead to the extinction of 10 per cent of land species and cause 
more frequent coral reef bleaching. At 2°C warming 15 to 40 per cent of land 
species could be facing extinction. Coral reefs would be expected to experience 
annual bleaching in many areas. At 3°C above pre-industrial temperatures, between 
20 and 50 per cent of land species could be threatened by extinction.  
The results are not inconsistent with IPCC (2007a), which reports that 
approximately 20–30 per cent of plant and animal species assessed so far are likely 
to be at increased risk of extinction if increases in global average temperature 
exceed 1.5–2.5°C. For higher increases in global average temperature, the IPCC 
reports that changes in ecosystem structure and function, species’ ecological 
interactions, and species’ geographic ranges are expected, with predominantly 
negative consequences for biodiversity, and ecosystem goods and services (for 
example, water supply).  
Stern does not discuss the value of ecosystems and biodiversity. The values 
involved relate to direct and indirect use, as well as to option, existence and bequest 
values (Dziegielewska et al. 2007). 
Food production 
Projected impacts of climate change in specific regions depend on initial conditions 
(how warm and dry), as well as on the degree of warming and water availability. 
Another critical factor is the extent to which higher atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide have beneficial effects on plant growth (the so-called ‘carbon 
fertilisation’ effect). The size of the carbon fertilisation effect is a subject of dispute 
in the literature. The Review contends that the effect is likely to be no more than 
half that typically included in crop models.  
                                                 
1 According to IPCC(2007c), the volumes of the Greenland and Antarctic Ice Sheets are 
equivalent to approximately 7 metres and 57 metres of sea level rise, respectively. However, ice 
core data show that neither ice sheet was completely removed during warm periods of at least 
the past million years. 
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The Review presents the expected impact on cereal production (compared to a 
future world without climate change) with strong and weak carbon fertilisation 
(figure 3.1). It shows that the expected loss of output would be relatively small with a 
strong carbon fertilisation effect, but may be more that 10 per cent if the carbon 
fertilisation effect were small. 
Figure 3.1 The impact of global warming on cereal production 
Percentage change compared to world without climate change 
 
Source: Stern (2007c). 
The Review contends that the effects might be even more negative because previous 
studies: 
• have focused on temperature increases of up to 4°C. At higher temperatures 
‘agricultural collapse across large areas of the world is possible … but clear 
empirical evidence is still limited’ (Stern 2007c, p. 81). 
• usually do not take into account a range of impacts of climate change that are 
likely to have negative effects on food production (such as, reduction of species 
(in particular pollinators), floods, and climate-induced pests and diseases). 
The Review warns that the impacts on agriculture and fisheries could place many 
people at risk of malnutrition, particularly in developing countries.  
Not all studies share the Review’s pessimistic view. Some assume that a higher 
carbon fertilisation effect or adaptation could offset the negative impacts.  
Hitz and Smith (2004), which the Review cites extensively, survey five studies 
investigating the possible effects of climate change on agricultural production. Their 
conclusions are as follows. 
• All studies indicate variation across regions — with the disparities in crop 
production between developed and developing countries expected to increase. 
• Results on global agriculture are ambiguous up to 3 to 4°C warming, but impacts 
are expected to be increasingly adverse beyond this threshold.  
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• If climate change results in increased climate variance, greater threat of pests, 
substantial reductions in irrigation supply, or less efficient or effective 
adaptation, the threshold could be lower. 
• In the long term, the impact of socioeconomic change may be larger than climate 
change — therefore, the results (in particular for people at risk of hunger) 
depend strongly on assumptions about socioeconomic change. 
Human health 
Climate change may have beneficial as well as adverse impacts on human health. 
The Review discusses the following projected impacts (which are primarily 
adverse). 
• The number of cold-related deaths would decrease in cold regions (northern 
latitudes in Europe, Russia, Canada and United States), whereas health impacts 
and deaths from heat stress are expected to increase.  
• Droughts and floods may directly cause death from dehydration and drowning 
and also might endanger access to clean water leading to an increase of 
water-borne diseases (for example, diarrhoeal diseases).  
• A wider distribution and abundance of disease vectors (in particular mosquitoes) 
may lead to a spread of vector-borne diseases (for example malaria and dengue 
fever) if effective control measures are not in place. 
• Extreme weather events (for example, storms, droughts and floods) may have 
direct and indirect health impacts. 
• In areas with declining output in agriculture and fisheries more people could 
suffer from malnutrition and related health impacts.   
The Review cites a World Health Organisation estimate that, since the 1970s, 
climate change is responsible for over 150 000 deaths each year through increasing 
incidence of diarrhoea, malaria and malnutrition, predominantly in Africa and other 
developing regions. According to the World Health Organisation an increase in 
global temperature of 1°C (above pre-industrial levels) could double this number of 
deaths. 
Hitz and Smith (2004) survey the literature on health impacts and conclude that: 
• health risks are more likely to increase than decrease as the temperature rises 
• while the reduction in cold-related mortality may dominate the increase of 
heat-related mortality for small temperature increases, higher rises are likely to 
increase mortality 
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• there is substantial uncertainty about the impacts. 
Critics have argued that the Review’s presentation is too negative, primarily 
because it fails to take into account the possibilities of preventing and mitigating a 
large share of the impacts as societies grow wealthier. Tol and Dowlatabadi (2001) 
consider that mortality from malaria can be reduced to virtually zero by providing 
access to public health services. Thus, economic development over this century 
would have a stronger impact on health than climate change. Tol et al. (2006) 
conclude:  
Climate change and its impact on malaria are important only if there is hardly any 
development over the 21st
 
century. Other infectious diseases behave similarly to 
malaria. (p. 7) 
They warn that:   
… assessments of the impacts of climate change that ignore the nuances in the 
relationships between the economic development and vulnerability can grossly 
misrepresent the risks of that change. (p. 2) 
Extreme weather events 
According to the Review, most impact studies ‘have focused predominantly on 
changes in average conditions and rarely examine the consequences of increased 
variability and more extreme weather’ (Stern 2007c, p. 68). The Review contends 
that the costs of extreme weather events2 (for example, storms, floods, droughts and 
heat waves) could increase substantially as a consequence of climate change ‘both 
by shifting the probability distribution upwards (more heatwaves, but fewer 
cold-snaps) and by intensifying the water cycle, so that severe floods, droughts and 
storms occur more often’ (Stern 2007c, p. 68). 
The Review contends also ‘that impacts in many sectors will become 
disproportionately more severe with rising temperatures’ (Stern 2007c, p. 71). It 
concludes that: ‘based on simple extrapolations, costs of extreme weather alone 
could reach 0.5–1% of world GDP per annum by the middle of the century, and will 
keep rising if the world continues to warm’ (Stern 2006b, p. viii). 
However, the Review acknowledges that ‘empirical support for these relationships 
is lacking’ (Stern 2007c, p. 71). It refers to the study by Hitz and Smith (2004) that 
reviewed studies that examined the relationship between the impacts of climate 
                                                 
2 ‘Extreme events’ are defined as occurrences where ‘a climate variable (e.g. temperature or 
rainfall) exceeds a particular threshold, e.g. two standard deviations from the mean.’ 
(Stern 2007c, p. 68.) 
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change and increasing global temperatures. Hitz and Smith found increasingly 
adverse impacts for several climate-sensitive sectors but were not able to determine 
if the increase was linear or exponential. For sectors like water and energy they 
found no consistent relationship with temperature. 
Scientific evidence of the impact of climate change on extreme events is not 
conclusive. The latest IPCC report acknowledges that, while linking a particular 
extreme event to a single, specific cause is problematic, statistical reasoning 
indicates ‘that substantial changes in the frequency of extreme events … can result 
from a relatively small shift of the distribution of a weather or climate variable’ 
(IPCC 2007d, 53). Figure 3.2 illustrates that an upward shift in the distribution as a 
whole will disproportionately increase the probability of extreme events and cause 
new ‘record’ events with previously unobserved extremes. 
In conclusion, there is substantial uncertainty about the nexus between global 
warming and the damages from extreme weather events. 
Figure 3.2 Effect of mean temperature increases on extreme temperatures 
 
Source: IPCC (2007d). 
Non-linear changes and threshold effects 
Most research on damage costs focuses on climate change impacts that occur 
gradually as climate forcing increases. However, the earth’s climate is a complex 
dynamic system, and in the past various incidences of abrupt large-scale climate 
changes seem to have taken place (see chapter 2, figure 2.4).  
The focus on the risk of triggering such large scale and irreversible climate change 
is one of the quintessential characteristics of the Review. Thus, Weitzman observes: 
Indeed … one has the feeling that the immorality of relegating future generations to 
live under the shadow of the open-ended possibilities of uncertain large-scale changes 
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in the climate system … is a major underlying leitmotif of the Review. 
(Weitzmann 2007, p. 22–3) 
Most climate scientists estimate that the probability of human emissions triggering 
such impacts is low, but not negligible. The Review emphasises that ‘the latest 
science indicates that the risk is more serious than once thought… Some 
temperature triggers, like 3 or 4°C of warming, could be reached this century if 
warming occurs quite rapidly’ (Stern 2007c, p. 95). Potential temperature triggers 
for such phenomena listed in the Review are reproduced in table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Potential temperature triggers for large-scale and abrupt 
changes in climate system 
 
Source: Stern (2007c). 
Such changes might be irreversible — at least on human time scales — and the 
damages that might be inflicted could be very high. The Review warns that this 
could potentially destabilise regions and increase regional conflict. It warns that a 
melting/collapse of polar ice sheets would accelerate sea level rise and might 
increase the sea level by 5 to 12 m over coming centuries. This would eventually 
lead to substantial loss of land, affecting around 5 per cent of the global population 
including many major cities (such as New York, London and Tokyo). Also, 
warming may induce sudden shifts in regional weather patterns, such as the Asian 
and African monsoons or the El Niño–Southern Oscillation, with severe 
consequences for water availability and food production.  
Summary and discussion 
The Review — like most of the relevant literature — emphasises the lack of data, 
non-comparability of impact studies and the pervasive uncertainties. However, its 
presentation of selected research and the conclusions drawn do not reflect more 
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optimistic views found in the literature. This has led to reproaches that its treatment 
was biased. While it is true that the Review’s presentation does not give equal 
weight to more optimistic views, the results of the impact analysis are generally 
consistent with the latest IPCC report.  
The Review also seems largely compatible with, although somewhat less 
circumspect than, a review of the global impacts literature by Hitz and Smith 
(2004). The findings of Hitz and Smith include the following. 
• At lower levels of climate change, the relationships range from increasing 
adverse impacts (in coastal resources, biodiversity, health, and possibly marine 
ecosystem productivity), to relationships where beneficial impacts are 
experienced at low to moderate levels of climate change (agriculture, terrestrial 
ecosystem productivity), to no consistent pattern (water, energy, aggregate 
costs).  
• None of the available studies suggested positive impacts from climate change in 
any sector as temperatures increased beyond certain levels (3-4 °C). It appears 
likely that as temperatures exceed this range, impacts in the vast majority of 
sectors will become increasingly adverse.  
Another criticism levelled at the Review’s analysis of damages of climate change is 
that it does not appropriately take into account the possibility of adaptation 
measures. Ideally there should be a more systematic analysis of different 
combinations of adaptation and associated damages. The Review acknowledges that 
adaptation could reduce damage costs substantially (figure 3.3). Most of the impact 
analysis presented by the Review assumes adaptation at the level of individuals or 
firms, but not economywide adaptations due to policy intervention.3 Systematic 
studies of the trade-off between adaptation and damage costs on a global level are 
not available and further research is required in this area. 
Another important criticism concerns the relationship between economic and social 
development and the damages from climate change. Some authors contend that 
vulnerability to some of the negative impacts of climate change (such as a spread of 
vector or water-borne diseases, famine and access to clean water) is confined 
mainly to developing countries, because they lack the capacity to deal with them 
effectively. Failing to recognise this, it is argued, can lead to overestimates of 
damages, because developing countries can be expected to become much wealthier 
and resilient before climate change could have major impacts. Also, assistance for 
adaptation and/or general economic development might be an efficient way to 
contain damages. While this aspect is not examined in the Review’s impact 
                                                 
3 In the modelling of overall damage costs different assumptions are made, namely that 90 per 
cent of the impacts are adapted to in rich countries, and 50 per cent in poor (see section 3.2).  
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analysis, sensitivity analysis has been conducted for aggregate damage costs (see 
chapter 5). 
Figure 3.3 The role of adaptation in reducing climate change damages 
 
Source: Stern (2007c). 
3.2 Modelling of the costs of climate change 
The Review’s approach 
The Review uses an Integrated Assessment Model (IAM), PAGE2002, to estimate 
damage costs for the cost–benefit analysis. IAMs simulate the key human and 
natural processes believed to be driving climate change and estimate the 
socioeconomic impacts. The Review opted to use PAGE2002 largely because it is 
able to simulate costs across a wide range of possible impacts and attach 
probabilities to the range of resulting damage cost estimates.  
Scenarios 
Using PAGE2002, damage costs were estimated out to 2200, for two different 
climate change scenarios (baseline and high climate) and three different sets of 
impact categories (figure 3.4).  
The baseline climate change scenario is based on the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change’s ‘A2’ scenario.4 The high climate scenario assumes a higher 
                                                 
4 The ‘A2’ scenario is one of six IPCC emission marker scenarios (chapter 2). 
   
30 THE STERN REVIEW: 




climate sensitivity than the baseline scenario, on the basis of recent evidence 
suggesting that amplifying feedbacks could be important.  
Temperature changes are useful to illustrate the two scenarios. Under the baseline 
scenario assumptions, there is a 90 per cent probability that the temperature increase 
will be between 2.4 and 5.8ºC in 2100, relative to the pre-industrial era. The 
corresponding confidence interval for the high scenario is 2.6–6.5ºC. While the 
difference between the two scenarios seems small, the probability of greater than 
6ºC of warming — an outcome that is likely to be associated with major damages 
from climate change — is about 3 per cent under the baseline scenario, compared 
with almost 10 per cent under the high scenario (figure 2.6). 
The Review defines three impact categories — market impacts, non-market impacts 
and the risk of catastrophic events — and the scenarios differ as to which they 
include (figure 3.4). Market impacts include only the effects of climate change that 
impact on market sectors of the economy. Non-market impacts are direct effects of 
climate change on human health and the environment for which no market price 
exists. Catastrophic events are losses from abrupt or discontinuous changes that 
could occur at higher levels of warming (see section 3.1).  
Figure 3.4 Matrix of climate scenarios and impact categories 






Source: Stern (2007c). 
Treatment of uncertainty 
The PAGE2002 model deals with the uncertainty inherent in the range of possible 
impacts using a ‘Monte Carlo’ simulation. Each scenario is run 1000 times. For 
each run, parameters are chosen at random from the ranges given in the climate 
change literature, so that the PAGE2002 model summarises the range of underlying 
• High climate 
• Market impacts 
• High climate 
• Market impacts + 
risk of catastrophe + 
non-market impacts 
     [‘high’ scenario] 
• Baseline climate 
• Market impacts 
• Baseline climate 
• Market impacts + 
risk of catastrophe  
      [‘low’ scenario] 
• Baseline climate 
• Market impacts + 
risk of catastrophe + 
non-market impacts 
[‘central case’ scenario] 
• High climate 
• Market impacts + 
risk of catastrophe 
Climate 
Impacts 
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research studies. The Monte Carlo simulation yields a probability distribution of 
damage cost estimates. This probability distribution can be used to give a point 
estimate that accounts for uncertainty, attitudes to risk and time preferences (see 
chapter 5). 
Calibration of the damage cost curve 
In PAGE2002, damage costs are calculated as GDP losses that are an ‘uncertain 
power function of temperature rise’ (Warren et al. 2006, p. 30). Costs are calculated 
for each of the eight world regions distinguished by the model. Total damage is 
added up from market and non-market costs as well as damages from abrupt climate 
change. 
The damage function is calibrated with a benchmark estimate of impacts from the 
literature for a mean temperature rise of 2.5°C over pre-industrial levels. The 
benchmark values — taken from IPCC (2001a) — are given in table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 Impact parameters in PAGE 2002, version 1.4 
PAGE2002 Impact Parameter Mean Min Mode Max Metric (where relevant)
Impact function exponent 1.77 1 1.3 3 
Market impact 0.50 -0.1 0.6 1 %GDP loss for 2.5°C
Non-market impact 0.73 0 0.7 1.5 %GDP loss for 2.5°C
Loss if catastrophe occurs 11.67 5 10 20 %GDP
Source: Warren et al. (2006). 
The sensitivity of damages to temperature increase is an uncertain variable. Its most 
likely value (mode) of 1.3 (table 3.3) goes back to Cline (1992), the range is taken 
from Peck and Teisberg (1992).  
The sum of market and non-market impacts is modelled to be consistent with the 
IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (IPCC 2001a, table 19.4).  
The damages from abrupt climate change (catastrophe) have been estimated to be 
an order of magnitude greater than the impacts from continuous change, which is 
reported as being ‘broadly consistent’ with the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report 
(Warren et al. 2006, p. 31). The chance of a catastrophic event is estimated to be 
zero at temperatures below 5°C above pre-industrial levels. Beyond this the risks 
increase by 1 to 20 per cent (most likely 10 per cent) for each subsequent 1°C rise 
in temperature. The probability of a catastrophic event is based on the approach 
used by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), which involved polling a number of experts.  
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PAGE2002 has the capability to allow for adaptation to climate change. Impacts are 
modelled to occur above some time-dependant profile of tolerable region-specific 
and sector-specific temperature rise. In the absence of adaptation the tolerable 
temperature rise is assumed to be zero (except for damages from abrupt climate 
change where a higher threshold is defined as described above). Adaptation can be 
modelled to influence the tolerable level or rate of temperature rise as well as the 
damages from an increase above the tolerable level. PAGE assumes that 90 per cent 
of the impacts are adapted to in rich countries, and 50 per cent in poor 
(Stern 2007b). 
Simulation results 
While six scenarios were modelled, the Review essentially dismisses the two that 
include only market impacts. The rationale for this is that ‘the omission of the very 
real risk of abrupt and large-scale changes at high temperatures creates an 
unrealistic negative bias in estimates’ (Stern 2007c, p. 177). Accordingly, the ‘low’ 
estimate of damage costs given in the Review is based on the ‘baseline climate with 
market impacts and risk of catastrophe’ scenario. As shown in figure 3.5a, the mean 
estimate of damage costs for this scenario rises to 5.3 per cent of global GDP in 
2200. This estimate carries much uncertainty, with a 10 per cent probability that 
damage costs are either less than 1 per cent or over 12 per cent of GDP.  
Adding non-market impacts and changing to the high climate scenario yields a 
‘high’ estimate of damage costs with a mean of 13.8 per cent of GDP in 2200 
(figure 3.5b). There is an even larger range of uncertainty in the high estimate of 
damage costs than in the low estimate.  
Non-market impacts are the most important difference between the low and high 
estimates — adding non-market impacts to the low estimate scenario gives a mean 
estimate of damage costs of 11.3 per cent of GDP by 2200. This scenario is 
described in the Review as the ‘central case’.  
The Review assumes that the ‘world instantaneously overcomes the problems of 
climate change in the year 2200’ (Stern 2007c, p. 184). This does not mean, 
however, that there are no costs associated with climate change after this date. 
Rather, it is assumed that GDP grows at the same rate (1.3 per cent) for all model 
runs from 2200 onwards. This means that GDP continues to be lower than it would 
have been without the preceding 200 years of climate change. 
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Figure 3.5 Damage costs 
(a) low estimate 
 
(b) high estimate 
 
Source: Stern (2007c). 
Discussion 
The Review’s estimation of damage costs displays some significant differences to 
existing studies using similar approaches: Most existing studies: 
• consider increases in average temperatures, but not increased variability and 
more extreme weather events 
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• do not take into account the potential impacts of large-scale climate shifts5  
• monetise only those impacts that are related to market-based activities, such as 
agricultural production or consumption of energy, or damages to assets that have 
a market value, excluding damages to human health, biodiversity and 
ecosystems 
• analyse temperature rises up to 4 or 5°C, not higher increases.  
The Review notes that estimates of the non-market impacts and the risk of abrupt, 
large-scale climate change are more uncertain than the economic costs. There 
inclusion has been criticised in several instances. Byatt et al. (2006, p. 203) 
denounce the inclusion of ‘very speculative non-economic costs with little empirical 
guidance’ as a ‘methodological departure’.  
However, other mainstream models, such as DICE/RICE and MERGE, include 
non-market costs.6 Non-market costs are a standard element of environmental cost–
benefit analysis and uncertainty does not justify their exclusion. Low-probability 
impacts with the potential of very high damages are also relevant to 
decision-making on climate policy. The Review presents the results for the three 
impact categories separately, allowing decision makers to take into account the 
respective uncertainties. 
The Review’s modelling approach adds one novel feature — the explicit treatment 
of uncertainty. PAGE2002 allows for ‘Monte Carlo’ simulations, where uncertain 
parameters are chosen at random from the ranges given in the climate change 
literature and thus enable a probability distribution over the possible outcomes. 
In the Review, the damage cost paths discussed above (figure 3.5) are aggregated 
over time and translated into ‘balanced growth equivalents’. This aggregation is 
based on several crucial assumptions about discount rates and the treatment of risk. 
These issues concern the aggregation of damages and of mitigation costs. They are 
discussed in chapter 5 of this paper, together with sensitivity analyses and a 
comparison with results from other models. 
3.3 Summary 
The Review presents two approaches to analysing the impacts of climate change. 
• An impact analysis discusses the effects of climate change on water availability, 
sea levels, ecosystems, food production and human health (in physical units).  
                                                 
5 A notable exception is Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). 
6 Warren et al. (2006) give an overview of the treatment of damage costs by various models. 
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• Overall damage estimates are derived using an Integrated Assessment Model.  
Estimates of the impacts of climate change in the literature vary widely. Some 
impacts may be beneficial for some regions at low levels of warming, but are 
expected to be increasingly negative with higher temperature increases. The Review 
emphasises the potential negative impacts, but acknowledges the controversies and 
uncertainties of impact assessments. 
The results drawn from the impact analysis are at the upper end of the range of the 
literature, because the Review draws heavily on some recent scientific literature that 
has a more pessimistic view on climate change and its impacts, and gives little 
regard to parts of the literature with a more optimistic view. 
The modelling results have a more extensive coverage of damage costs than most 
previous studies, including market and non-market impacts as well as the risk of 
abrupt, large-scale climate change. 
The Review provides limited focus on the potential for adaptation measures to 
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4 Mitigation costs 
The costs of responding to climate change are just as important for policy decisions 
as the damage costs. Policymakers need to consider the costs as well as the benefits 
from action. For its part, the Review’s key conclusion relies on estimates of the 
costs of action — its call for strong early action on climate change is based, in part, 
on its comparison of damage costs equivalent to 5 to 20 per cent of GDP and 
mitigation costs of 1 per cent of GDP.1  
This estimate of mitigation costs relates to the total annual costs in 2050 associated 
with a stabilisation target of 500–550 ppm carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). The 
stabilisation target adopted for the Review is influenced by analysis that shows that 
mitigation costs increase steeply for more stringent targets (box 4.1, see also 
chapter 6). The cost estimate for 2050 is used to give an indication of the time path 
for costs over the coming century. There is less confidence in mitigation cost 
estimates for the second half of the century, but ‘the average expected cost is likely 
to remain around 1%’ (Stern 2006b, p. xiv). The focus on total costs is justified by a 
discussion of why total costs are more relevant than marginal abatement costs 
(box 4.2). 
 
Box 4.1 Mitigation costs increase rapidly as mitigation efforts become 
more ambitious 
Total cost increases rapidly as mitigation efforts become more ambitious, because as 
more mitigation is undertaken, more costly options must be pursued. Further, more 
stringent targets will require significant reductions in emissions over the next couple of 
decades, which could necessitate retiring emissions-intensive capital assets early 
(such as coal-fired power stations). 
Based on macroeconomic modelling results, Stern finds that increases in the amount 
of mitigation are likely to necessitate a ‘greater-than-proportionate increase in costs’ 
(Stern 2007c, p. 269). For example, the cost of stabilising emissions at 450–500 ppm 
CO2e is estimated to be around three times the cost of stabilisation at 500–550 ppm 
CO2e.  
 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘mitigation’ and ‘abatement’ are generally used interchangeably in the climate 
change literature. They both refer to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
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Box 4.2 Total, marginal and average abatement costs 
Stern contends that total abatement costs are more important than marginal costs 
when deciding whether large-scale mitigation is worthwhile, because changes are large 
and ‘the marginal abatement cost … is an appropriate measuring device only in the 
case of small changes’ (Stern 2007c, p. 241). However, Stern also compares marginal 
abatement costs with marginal damage costs to determine whether immediate action is 
merited at the margin. The conclusion is that action is merited on this basis because 
abatement costs are negative in some cases, whereas damage costs are positive. 
Total abatement costs are closely linked to average abatement costs, because the 
latter is obtained by dividing total abatement costs by the quantity of abatement. 
The distinction between marginal and average abatement costs is important, because 
they are likely to follow different paths over time. Stern points out that ‘[t]he marginal 
abatement cost should rise over time to remain equal to the social cost of carbon, 
which itself rises with the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere’ (2007, p. 241). 
Average costs will be less than marginal costs (as the most expensive projects are 
undertaken last) and will depend both on the depth of emission cuts and the pace at 
which technological change brings down total costs of abatement. Thus, it is possible 
for average costs to fall (or at least rise more slowly) even as marginal abatement 
costs increase (Stern 2007c, box 9.6). This is the case for the resource cost estimates 
presented by Stern, which show average costs decreasing over time (table below), 
while marginal costs rise (Dietz et al. 2007). 
Table Average mitigation costs decreasing over time 
Resource cost estimates in the Stern Review (fossil fuel abatement only) 
  2015 2025 2050
Average cost of abatement US$/tCO2 61 33 22
Emissions abated (relative to BAU) GtCO2 2.2 10.7 42.6
Total cost of abatement US$ billion 134 349 930
Source: Stern (2007c). 
 
 
In the climate change literature, two basic approaches are used to estimate 
mitigation costs: resource costs (or bottom-up) and macroeconomic modelling (or 
top-down) (IPCC 2001b). In either case, mitigation costs are dependent on a host of 
different factors, which makes it difficult to estimate costs precisely (box 4.3). The 
conclusions in the Review draw on estimates using both resource cost and 
macroeconomic modelling approaches. 
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Box 4.3 Key factors influencing mitigation costs 
Several factors have been identified as key determinants of mitigation costs. 
• Depth of emission cuts: costs increase rapidly with deeper emission cuts. The 
amount of mitigation required is given by the ‘mitigation gap’ between the emissions 
goal and business-as-usual emissions (Stern 2007c). Business-as-usual emissions 
depend on population and productivity growth rates, developments in the relative 
price of fossil fuels, technological change, and the availability of less carbon-
intensive sources of energy (IPCC 2001b).  
• Technological change: the rate and characteristics of technological change play an 
important part in determining mitigation costs. According to IPCC (2001b), important 
characteristics of technological change concern the existence and extent of: 
– a ‘backstop’ technology2 — the existence of a carbon-free backstop technology 
would reduce mitigation costs (Edenhofer et al. 2006) 
– induced technological change — mitigation costs are lower if policy changes 
induce technological change (Edenhofer et al. 2006) 
– potential emissions savings from increased energy efficiency — some estimates 
suggest that efficiency in the use of fossil fuels is likely to be the single largest 
source of fossil fuel-related emission savings in 2050 (IEA 2006a). In some 
cases, efficiency improvements are seen as ‘negative cost’ abatement 
opportunities. 
• Price elasticities: estimates of price-induced substitution possibilities between fuels 
and between energy and other inputs can be crucial for mitigation costs 
(IPCC 2001b). The extent to which price increases in emissions-intensive goods 
lead to less consumption of these goods will also be important.  
• Efficiency of policy: Mitigation costs are lower when there is ‘what’, ‘where’ and 
‘when’ flexibility over how emission savings are achieved (Stern 2007c). 
– ‘What’ flexibility refers to having a wide choice of sectors and technologies and 
the inclusion of non-CO2 emissions. 
– ‘Where’ flexibility implies that emission-saving efforts are concentrated in parts of 
the globe where mitigation costs are lowest. 
– ‘When’ flexibility relates to the timing of mitigation.  
Whether revenues from policy measures are ‘recycled’ to reduce distorting taxes or 
to provide incentives for low-carbon innovation is also an important determinant of 
mitigation costs (Edenhofer et al. 2006). 
• Extent of ‘ancillary benefits’: ancillary benefits are effects of climate change 
mitigation on problems other than greenhouse gas emissions, such as reductions in 
local air pollution (IPCC 2001b). Ancillary benefits are potentially important in 
reducing the net cost of mitigation (Stern 2007c).3  
 
                                                 
2 A backstop technology refers to a fuel that becomes perfectly elastic in supply at a given price. 
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4.1 Resource cost approach 
The resource cost approach uses costs of individual emission-saving measures to 
estimate mitigation costs — a ‘bottom-up’ approach. Emission-saving measures can 
include improving energy efficiency, substituting toward low-emissions 
technologies, planting new forests and avoiding deforestation. As the resource cost 
approach does not use an economywide model, ‘second round’ effects (such as 
feedbacks between the energy sector and the rest of the economy) are generally not 
included, nor are opportunities to respond that involve price-induced reductions in 
demand for high-emissions goods and services. 
Estimate of mitigation costs in the Stern Review 
Using the resource cost method, the Review concludes that a 550 ppm CO2e target 
will cost about 1 per cent of GDP by 2050.  
This estimate was reached by considering the costs of a portfolio of fossil fuel and 
non-fossil-fuel related measures. For fossil fuel emissions, Stern envisages savings 
coming from a portfolio of technologies (figure 4.1). Fossil fuel technologies 
constitute almost four-fifths of the total abatement by 2050. The remaining one-fifth 
of abatement comes from cutting non-fossil-fuel related emissions. Measures 
include reforestation, avoiding deforestation, changes to land management practises, 
and reducing non-CO2 emissions from energy-related sources and agriculture. On 
average, non-fossil-fuel emission reduction is estimated to be about half as 
expensive (per tonne of CO2) as fossil fuel reductions. 
The resource cost estimate carries a large degree of uncertainty. In the main body of 
the report, the Review is clear on this uncertainty: ‘even in the near to medium term, 
the uncertainties are very large’ (Stern 2007c, p. 253). As well as the central 
estimate of 1 per cent of GDP, a range from -1 per cent to 3.5 per cent is given. This 
range is based on the sensitivity of the estimates to assumptions about technological 
change and the depth of emission cuts required.  
The Review presents the resource cost estimate of 1 per cent of GDP as an upper 
bound estimate of costs and justifies this on the grounds that ‘it does not take 
account of opportunities to respond involving reductions in demand for high-carbon 
goods and services’ (Stern 2006b, p. xiii). Stern also notes that ‘there generally will 
                                                                                                                                                    
3 If one were to carry out a traditional cost–benefit analysis and weigh the ‘costs’ of climate 
change mitigation on one hand against its ‘benefits’, then ancillary benefits would be included 
on the ‘benefits’ side of the ledger along with avoided damages from climate change. However, 
because damages from climate change are generally estimated separately from ancillary effects, 
studies that consider ancillary benefits tend to do so as an offset to mitigation costs. 
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be cheaper methods than any one particular set [of ways of reducing emissions] 
chosen by assumption’ (Stern 2007c, p. 241). Further, the resource cost method 
does not include ancillary benefits in the cost estimate. 
Figure 4.1 Sources of emission savings, 2050 
Fossil fuel emissions only — total abatement of 43 GtCO2a 
b
Efficiency







a Non-fossil-fuel emission savings of 11 GtCO2 were also included in the resource cost estimates. 
b Decentralized forms of generation and combined heat and power. 
Source: Stern (2007c). 
Discussion 
While the points noted by Stern are valid, the resource cost estimate is not 
necessarily an upper bound on costs. There are other effects, such as feedbacks 
between the energy sector and the rest of the economy, that the resource cost 
estimates ignore and which could lead to higher costs. In its third assessment report, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reported that ‘[i]n previous 
studies, bottom-up models tended to generate relatively low mitigation costs’ 
(IPCC 2001b, p. 489). In the summary for policymakers of their subsequent 
assessment report, the IPCC found that at an aggregate level ‘top-down studies are 
in line with bottom-up studies’ (IPCC 2007b, p. 11), with no suggestion that 
bottom-up studies represented an upper bound on costs. The resource cost estimates 
are also unlikely to represent an upper bound on costs if assumptions about factors 
such as the rate of technical change and the efficiency of policy instruments turn out 
to be optimistic.  
   
42 THE STERN REVIEW: 




Besides the optimism of framing costs as an ‘upper bound’ estimate, there have 
been some other criticisms of the Review’s resource cost estimates. While critiques 
of the review have tended not to dwell on the resource cost estimates to any great 
extent, Tol and Yohe (2006) and Mendelsohn (2006) both criticise Stern’s 
approach. Tol and Yohe (2006) contend that Stern underestimates costs because of 
the omission of impacts on economic growth and capital stock turnover. However, 
Anderson (2007) counters that capital stock turnover was allowed for in the 
resource cost estimates. Mendelsohn (2006) expresses a view that allowing for 
carbon capture and storage is overly optimistic because it is not yet a proven 
technology, and that the amount of land required for renewable energy on the scale 
proposed would have secondary effects that are not considered by Stern. 
To give an indication of how the Review fits in with other studies, its estimates can 
be compared with previous estimates in the literature. Two of the most widely 
quoted sources of resource cost estimates are the IPCC and the International Energy 
Agency (IEA). Estimates from these sources are independent of those in the Review 
and are useful for comparison purposes. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates 
A summary of results from bottom-up studies is presented in the summary for 
policymakers of the contribution of working group III to the IPCC’s fourth 
assessment report (IPCC 2007b). These results incorporate both fossil fuel and 
non-fossil-fuel mitigation. 
The IPCC’s estimates are broadly consistent with those in the Review. Direct 
comparison of the Review’s cost estimate of 1 per cent of GDP by 2050 is not 
possible because the IPCC only reports bottom-up estimates until 2030, and focuses 
on marginal costs of mitigation. The IPCC suggests that mitigation consistent with 
meeting the Review’s target can be achieved at a marginal cost of US$50 per tonne 
of CO2 in 2030.4 Marginal costs will be higher than average costs (box 4.2), so the 
IPCC estimate of marginal costs of US$50 per tonne of CO2 in 2030 does not 
conflict with the Review’s average cost (for fossil fuel mitigation only) of around 
US$30 per tonne of CO2 in that year (Stern 2007c, figure 9.5). In fact, using 
Anderson’s (2007) figure of marginal costs of 2-4 times average costs, the IPCC 
estimates for 2030 appear to be slightly more optimistic than those in Stern, based 
on the marginal costs alone. 
                                                 
4 The IPCC reports that mitigation of 13 to 26 GtCO2 is likely to be available in 2030 at a 
marginal cost of US$50 per tonne of CO2. This is consistent with the emissions scenarios 
underlying the resource cost estimates in the Stern Review, which project just over 15 GtCO2 
abatement from fossil fuel related sources in 2030 (Stern 2007c, figure 9.3) and further 
abatement from non-fossil-fuel related abatement. 
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International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates 
The IEA released two reports in 2006 containing estimates of the costs of reducing 
fossil fuel emissions using a resource cost approach: World Energy Outlook 
(IEA 2006b) and Energy Technology Perspectives (IEA 2006a). Both reports 
conclude that significant cuts in emissions are possible from a range of different 
technologies, at little or no net cost. 
The IEA estimates are of particular interest because they were summarised within 
the Review. Section 9.9 of the Review uses the two IEA reports to support its 
resource cost estimates. 
The alternative policy scenario in IEA (2006b) analyses how the global energy 
market could evolve if countries were to adopt all of the policies they are currently 
considering related to energy security and energy-related CO2 emissions. Under the 
alternative policy scenario, fossil-fuel CO2 emissions are cut by 6.3 gigatonnes (Gt) 
relative to the reference scenario in 2030. As the IEA explains, these emission 
reductions carry no net cost: 
… energy and emissions savings in the Alternative Policy Scenario can be achieved at 
net benefit (negative cost) to society. This is not to say the savings are free, but rather 
that the higher capital spending to improve energy efficiency is more than offset by 
savings in consumers’ fuel expenditures over the lifetime of the equipment’. 
(IEA 2006b, p. 205)  
In IEA (2006a), five accelerated technology scenarios are used to demonstrate that 
technologies that already exist, or are likely to become commercially available in 
the next two decades, can be used to return global energy-related CO2 emissions 
toward today’s level by 2050. The main alternative policy scenario is estimated to 
reduce fossil fuel related emissions in 2050 by 32 GtCO2e at a net discounted cost 
of US$100 billion, incurred over the period 2005-2050. Under the discount rate 
used by the IEA for this exercise (5 per cent) this is equivalent to net costs of less 
than US$6 billion per year, or less than 0.02 per cent of world GDP in 2005.5 
However, these estimates exclude the costs of research and development that would 
be needed to sustain the accelerated technology scenarios.  
In finding that there are significant emissions savings available at little or no cost, 
the IEA estimates mirror the optimism in Enqvist, Naucler and Rosander (2007)6 
(figure 4.2). This is likely to be overly optimistic because, as the IPCC (2001b) has 
said, ‘the key question is … the extent to which market imperfections that inhibit 
                                                 
5 World GDP in 2005 was approximately US$45 trillion (World Bank 2007). 
6 In addition to similarities between the conclusions of the two studies, Enqvist, Naucler and 
Rosander (2007) use the IEA’s business-as-usual projections. 
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access to these potentials can be removed cost-effectively by policy initiatives’ 
(p. 503). To put it another way, if abatement yields benefits irrespective of the 
climatic impacts, then why isn’t this abatement being done already? And how will 
policy change this? In the Australian context, the Productivity Commission 
concluded that ‘the scope for achieving environmental gains through increasing the 
uptake of only those energy efficiency improvements that are privately cost 
effective appears to be modest’ (PC 2005, p. xx). 
Figure 4.2 Cost of abatement technologies 
Estimates from Enqvist, Naucler and Rosander (2007) 
Source: Enqvist, Naucler and Rosander (2007). 
In World Energy Outlook and Energy Technology Perspectives, the IEA finds that 
reductions in fossil fuel emissions are significantly less costly than suggested by the 
Review. This can be partly explained by differences in the mitigation targets. The 
World Energy Outlook estimates relate to significantly less mitigation than in the 
Stern Review (6.3 GtCO2 compared with about 16 GtCO2 from fossil fuel emissions 
abatement in 2030 in the Review7). Energy Technology Perspectives also considers 
the costs of less abatement (32 GtCO2 compared with 43 GtCO2 in the Review) and 
excludes costs associated with additional research and development. 
                                                 
7 Stern (2007c), figure 9.3. 
   
 MITIGATION COSTS 45
 
Differences between the Review’s resource cost estimates and those from the IEA 
are also partly explained by differences in how much mitigation is assumed to be 
available from energy efficiency measures at negative or little cost. The Review 
assumes that less emissions savings are available through efficiency than does the 
IEA (2006b) (Anderson 2006). Given the difficulties with accessing gains from 
privately cost effective energy efficiency measures noted in PC (2005), Stern’s 
more moderate estimates are probably preferred to those of the IEA. However, the 
Review does cite the IEA estimates in chapter 9 and, while these are only used as 
supporting evidence for the Review’s own estimates, the use of the IEA estimates 
should be seen to be optimistic. 
Overall, the Review’s estimate of mitigation costs of about 1 per cent of GDP by 
2050 seems reasonable compared with other resource cost estimates. There is no 
indication that the estimate in the Review is an outlier, though nor is it clear that it 
represents an upper bound on costs, as suggested by Stern. 
4.2 Macroeconomic modelling approach 
Macroeconomic modelling of mitigation explores the economywide effects of the 
transition to a lower emissions economy. As such, macroeconomic modelling is 
often referred to as a ‘top-down’ approach (IPCC 2001b). Macroeconomic 
modelling uses estimated parameters to model demand and supply. This means that 
the dynamic interactions of different factors over time can be tracked, including 
responses to price changes. Some critics complain, however, that macroeconomic 
models do not contain the sectoral details needed to model mitigation costs 
accurately (IPCC 2001b).  
Estimate of mitigation costs in the Review 
Based on macroeconomic modelling, chapter 10 of the Review concludes that ‘the 
expected annual cost of achieving emissions reductions, consistent with an 
emissions trajectory leading to stabilisation at around 500–550 ppm CO2e, is likely 
to be around 1% of GDP by 2050, with a range of +/-3%’ (Stern 2007c, p. 267). 
The Review says that costs are likely to remain around 1 per cent of GDP from 
mid-century, but with the range of uncertainty growing over time. 
The macroeconomic modelling estimates in the Review are based on meta-analyses 
of results from a range of models. Stern draws on a broad range of model 
comparison studies, including those discussed in the following section, and does not 
cite a particular source for the Review’s estimates. However, the focus is mainly on 
the estimates from a meta-analysis undertaken for the Review (Barker et al. 2006).  
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The Barker et al. meta-analysis is based primarily on models that assume climate 
change policy will stimulate technological change in a way that reduces future 
mitigation costs. That is, the rates of development of low-emissions technologies 
will be increased through direct government support for research and development 
and the incentives created by emissions pricing. Concentrating on models that 
incorporate this ‘induced technological change’ restricted the analysis to 11 models 
that estimate costs up to 2050.8 Nine of the 11 models are part of the Innovation 
Modelling Comparison Project (IMCP), which is discussed in the following section. 
Problems identifying the factors affecting the costs of mitigation in such a small 
dataset meant that the analysis in Barker et al. was extended to include two earlier 
meta-analyses (Repetto and Austin 1997, and Barker et al. 2002). The results 
published in the Review (figure 10.1) incorporate all three datasets. The two 
additional datasets do not generally allow for induced technological change. 
Discussion 
Some insight as to how the Stern Review estimates compare with the broader 
literature are available from comparing the Review’s estimates with those from 
model comparison projects. Model comparison projects are an ideal benchmark 
because their estimates are averaged across a range of underlying models, 
eliminating much of the variability across different models. In this section, model 
comparison projects are used to highlight the importance of the Review’s treatment 
of technological change and the divergence between the Review and the literature 
regarding post-2050 mitigation costs. 
The Review’s approach of using macroeconomic modelling to estimate mitigation 
costs is well supported by the literature. Macroeconomic modelling is the only way 
to estimate the costs of mitigation over long time periods so as to take account of 
interactions between the energy sector and the broader economy. Importantly, there 
are many independent, peer-reviewed estimates of mitigation costs from 
macroeconomic models (Fischer and Morgenstern 2005).  
While the overall approach is valid, how representative are the results? The results 
of macroeconomic modelling depend crucially on the type of model used and the 
assumptions made, particularly assumptions concerning the key factors affecting 
mitigation costs (box 4.3). As a consequence, the results from individual models 
vary widely — cost estimates presented in the Review alone range from -4 per cent 
of GDP (net gains) to 15 per cent of GDP. 
                                                 
8 One model, ‘PANTA_RHEI’ only estimates costs up to 2020. 
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The Review lists several model comparison projects as some of the most up-to-date 
and extensive. The literature, as well as the estimates cited in critiques of the 
Review (for example, in Tol and Yohe 2006), suggest that the Review’s list is a 
reasonable one. Model comparison projects cited by the Review include: 
• Stanford University’s Energy Modelling Forum (EMF-21) 
• the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (TAR)9 
• the IMCP  
• the US Climate Change Science Program’s (CCSP) synthesis and assessment of 
scenarios of greenhouse-gas emissions and atmospheric concentrations.10 
Compared with estimates from these model comparison projects, the mitigation cost 
estimates in the Review appear to be optimistic. Mitigation costs in 2050 for 
stabilisation at 500–550 ppm CO2e are at the lower end of the estimates in the 
literature. Further, the conclusion that costs remain constant as a proportion of GDP 
from mid-century is not supported by the literature. 
Estimated costs in 2050 are relatively low in the Review largely because of its 
reliance on models (in Barker et al. 2006) that assume climate change policy will 
induce technological change. Model comparison exercises using models that do not 
consider induced technological change (EMF-21, IPCC TAR and US CCSP) 
generally find that mitigation costs for stabilisation at 500–550 ppm CO2e will 
exceed 1 per cent of GDP by 2050 (figure 4.3). The IMCP suggests costs more in 
keeping with the Stern estimates, because the models in the IMCP incorporate 
induced technological change. When induced technological change is switched off, 
average costs from the IMCP are greater than those from the other model 
comparison projects.  
Results from the IPCC’s fourth assessment report (IPCC 2007b) further support the 
importance of induced technological change. IPCC (2007b) considered some 
models that incorporated induced technological change and reported cost estimates 
that are close to those in the Review, though for a slightly less stringent target. The 
report presents a median macroeconomic cost estimate of 1.3 per cent of global 
GDP in 2050, for stabilisation at 535–590 ppm CO2e (just above the stabilisation 
range considered by Stern). 
                                                 
9 The IPCC’s fourth assessment report was released after the Stern Review. 
10 The Review also mentions two other comparisons: the meta-analysis study by Fischer and 
Morgenstern and the International Energy Agency accelerated technology scenarios. Fischer 
and Morgenstern (2006) is largely based on a study by the EMF to measure the costs of the 
Kyoto Protocol (EMF-16) and is not as relevant here as more recent EMF work. The 
International Energy Agency accelerated technology scenarios in IEA (2006a) are based on only 
one macroeconomic model — the IEA Energy Technology Perspectives model. 
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In principle, modelling of mitigation costs should allow for the possibility of 
induced technological change. The effect of climate change policies on the 
development and spread of new technologies is an important part of their impact, 
and among the most important determinants of a policy’s success (IPCC 2001b). 
However, there are practical difficulties. Induced technological change is difficult to 
model and Barker et al. (2006, p. 1) concede that ‘induced technological change is a 
relatively new topic in economic modelling and results are often experimental and 
controversial’. Tol claims that because the Review’s cost estimates ‘are largely 
inspired by the Innovation Modeling Comparison Project’, it incorporates ‘overly 
optimistic assumptions on technological progress and the costs of emission 
abatement’ (Tol 2006, p. 3). 
The Review has been criticised for being too optimistic in assumptions about 
revenue recycling and ancillary benefits from mitigation (Byatt et al. 2006). 
However, to the extent that revenue recycling and ancillary benefits can be 
modelled accurately, their inclusion should improve the cost estimates by 
broadening the analysis to include more of the consequences of climate change 
mitigation. Further, revenue recycling and ancillary benefits feature in only a few of 
the models used by Stern, so their effect on the overall conclusions is small. 
Revenue recycling and ancillary benefits are two of several factors where, as in 
other meta-analyses, there are a range of assumptions underlying the Stern 
estimates. This is common in model comparison projects because different 
modelling teams incorporate different assumptions on factors relevant to mitigation 
costs. For example, the models used for the Review incorporate a range of 
assumptions about backstop technologies and price elasticities. In effect, this means 
that the results are averages over different assumptions for the key factors driving 
mitigation costs (outlined in box 4.3). 
Assumptions on policy are optimistic in some regards and pessimistic in others. The 
models underlying the Stern estimates are optimistic about ‘where’ flexibility as the 
economic instrument is usually emissions trading or taxes at a global level 
(Barker et al. 2006). However, there is assumed to be little ‘what’ flexibility in the 
abatement mix of different greenhouse gases, because the modelling only considers 
mitigation of CO2. The importance of ‘what’ flexibility is illustrated by the results 
of EMF-21, which suggest that confining mitigation to CO2 emissions is likely to 
increase costs in 2050 by 50 per cent compared with multigas mitigation 
(figure 4.3). 
The basis for the conclusion in the Review that mitigation costs remain constant as 
a proportion of GDP after 2050 is unclear, as it is not supported by the major model 
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comparison projects mentioned in the Review. The IMCP11, EMF-21 and the 
US CCSP all suggest that mitigation costs for stabilisation are likely to rise in the 
second half of the twenty-first century (figure 4.3). The IPCC (2001b and 2007) is 
not clear on whether mitigation costs are likely to increase or decrease after 2050. 
Figure 4.3 Mitigation cost estimates from model comparison projects 
Reduction in GDP for stabilisation at, or just above, the Stern target 




















































a Radiative forcing of 4.5 Wm-2 corresponds to a CO2 concentration of just under 550 ppm (US CCSP 2006; 
table 1.2) and a CO2e concentration of over 550 ppm (Kemfert, Truong and Buckner 2005). Results are 
averaged over all models that report changes in GDP for the relevant year. b 450 ppm CO2 corresponds with 
approximately 500–550 ppm CO2e, which is the Review’s target (Stern 2007c). c Emissions marker scenarios 
from the IPCC’s Special Report on Emission Scenarios (IPCC 2000). d Chosen so that the associated CO2 
concentration would be roughly 450 ppm, which corresponds with the Review’s target (US CCSP 2006).  
Sources: Weyant, de la Chesnaye and Blanford (2006); IPCC (2001b); Barker et al. (2006); US CCSP (2006). 
                                                 
11 Three of the models in the IMCP are of a predominantly exploratory nature (Edenhofer, 
Lessmann and Grubb 2006). These models could conceivably be responsible for the upward 
trend in average cost estimates for the second half of the century. However, the majority of the 
‘central models’ identified in the IMCP synthesis report (Edenhofer et al 2006) suggest that 
costs will rise after 2050 (Rao, Keppo and Riahi 2006; Popp 2006; Bosetti, Carraro and 
Galeotti 2006). 
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4.3 Summary and conclusions 
Assessing the likely costs of responding to climate change is difficult, because 
estimates of mitigation costs depend on several key factors, including: 
• the depth of emission cuts 
• the rate and nature of technological change  
• price elasticities  
• the efficiency of policy 
• the extent of ‘ancillary benefits’ from mitigation. 
The Review estimates the annual costs of stabilisation at atmospheric 
concentrations of 500–550 ppm CO2e to be around 1 per cent of global GDP in 
2050, and likely to remain around this level after 2050. Overall, these estimates 
appear to be somewhat optimistic. 
The Review is creditable in using both of the two major approaches to estimating 
mitigation costs — the resource cost approach and the macroeconomic modelling 
approach. 
The resource cost estimates in the Review are broadly consistent with, or if 
anything slightly less optimistic than, those from other widely quoted sources. 
However, it is difficult to compare the estimates because of differences in the 
objectives of the different studies. Some other estimates, especially those by the 
IEA, are very optimistic about the prospects of achieving substantial mitigation at 
negative or little cost. Thus, it is not clear that they provide a reliable benchmark for 
comparison. Also, the Review’s framing of the resource cost estimates as an upper 
bound on costs is not justified. 
Compared with estimates from the major model comparison projects, the 
macroeconomic modelling estimates in the Review appear to be optimistic. 
Mitigation costs in 2050 for stabilisation at 500–550 ppm CO2e are at the lower end 
of the estimates in the literature, largely because of a reliance on models that 
assume technological change will be induced by policy action. Further, the 
conclusion that costs remain constant as a proportion of GDP from mid-century is 
not supported by the literature, which generally suggests they will rise. 
In any case, the cost estimates depend on certain requirements of policy being met. 
The Stern estimates reflect ‘the likely costs under a flexible, global policy, 
employing a variety of economic instruments in cost-effective ways’ 
(Dietz et al. 2007, p. 151). To the extent that climate change policy departs from 
these requirements, costs would be expected to increase. 
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The cost estimates carry a large degree of uncertainty and this is acknowledged in 
the body of the report, but not in the headline conclusions. One way that uncertainty 
could have been incorporated into the Review’s conclusions would have been to 
express mitigation costs in terms of a ‘certainty equivalent’ that accounted for risk 
aversion, as was done for damage costs. The Review has been criticised for not 
doing so (Yohe, Tol and Murphy 2007; Maddison 2007) but Stern has countered 
that this would make little difference, because the distribution of mitigation cost 
estimates is far narrower than that of damage costs (Dietz et al. 2007). Regardless, 
not carrying any acknowledgement of uncertainty in mitigation costs to the headline 
conclusions could be misleading. 
 
 
   




5 Aggregating costs and benefits 
Chapters 3 and 4 considered climate change damage costs and mitigation costs as they 
might occur over time. This chapter examines the aggregation of these costs to give single 
figure estimates. Aggregation involves discounting over time, dealing with the uncertainty 
of estimates and deciding whether to weight costs in poorer countries more heavily for 
equity reasons. 
5.1 Discounting over time 
Because damage costs from climate change are expected to remain relatively small for 
decades and then increase gradually, the choice of discount rates is critical. The Review 
uses discount rates that are very low by conventional standards and this has received great 
attention from critics. 
The Review’s approach 
Within the welfare economics approach adopted by the Review, an increment of future 
consumption is typically held to be worth less (that is, have less utility) than an increment 
of current consumption for two reasons. The Review states: 
First, if consumption grows, people are better off in the future than they are now and an 
extra unit of consumption is generally taken to be worth less, the richer people are. 
Second, it is sometimes suggested that people prefer to have good things earlier rather 
than later – ‘pure time preference’ – based presumably in some part on an assessment 
of the chances of being alive to enjoy consumption later and in some part ‘impatience’. 
(Stern 2007c, p. 35) 
Therefore, to make a unit of future consumption equivalent to a unit of current 
consumption a discount rate must be applied. In welfare economics, the formula commonly 
used for this purpose is:   
Rate of discount = δ + ηg 
Where: δ (‘delta’) is the rate of pure time preference (also called the utility discount rate); 
η (‘eta’) is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption; and g is the growth rate of 
per capita consumption. 
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For Stern, the fact that climate change will have impacts over a very long time period, and 
will therefore affect future generations, needs to be considered when choosing δ. The 
Review concludes, on ethical grounds, that the welfare of future generations should be 
treated on a par with our own and, therefore, that the future should not be discounted 
simply because it is the future. In support of this position he quotes various economists 
including Ramsey, Pigou, Solow and Sen. This suggests setting δ at zero. Stern, however, 
settles on 0.1, so as to allow for the possibility of the human race becoming extinct (and 
therefore, future generations being absent). 
Stern takes η to be 1, ‘in line with recent empirical estimates’ (Stern 2007c, p. 184).1 This 
implies that people derive the same utility from an additional one per cent of consumption, 
irrespective of their pre-existing level of consumption. Another implication is that an extra 
unit of consumption to ‘Person A, with three times the consumption of Person B, would 
have one third the value to that if the extra unit went to Person B’ (Stern 2007c, p. 662).  
Substituting these values for δ and η into the equation above results in a discount rate equal 
to 0.1 plus the growth rate of per capita consumption. In the analysis conducted for the 
Review, discount rates vary across scenarios and paths (and over time) depending on the 
growth rate of per capita consumption. This is consistent with Stern’s view that the impacts 
of climate change could be large relative to the global economy and that using a single set 
of discount rates for such non-marginal changes is inappropriate. 
While it is important to appreciate that Stern uses discount rates that vary, there has been 
an understandable desire among commentators to have a single rate that can be taken as 
indicative of discounting in the Review. The Review states that the annual average 
projection for per capita consumption growth is 1.3 per cent for the period 2001 to 2200 ‘in 
PAGE2002’s baseline world without climate change’ (Stern 2007c, p. 184). This has led a 
number of commentators to suggest that the Review uses discount rates of around 1.4 per 
cent per annum (real) (Mendelsohn 2006; Weitzman 2007). Byatt et al. (2006), however, 
claim that HM Treasury has supplied data that imply that Stern has used discount rates of 
2.1 per cent for the current century, 1.9 per cent for next century and 1.4 per cent 
thereafter. It is not entirely clear which figures are more indicative of the varying discount 
rates used in the Review, but a discount rate of 1.4 per cent per annum seems more likely 
as it is consistent with the Review’s baseline projections for consumption growth.  
                                                 
1 Stern also suggests that other values (including higher values) for η could be investigated. No 
other values were used in the initial analysis, but a postscript to the Review (discussed later) 
includes sensitivity analysis with η set to 1, 1.25 and 1.5. 
   





There is a long-standing debate on how to choose appropriate discount rates for public 
policy evaluation, particularly where long time frames are involved — as they are with 
climate change. The importance of the discount rate is illustrated in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Present value of a future benefit of $1000, by discount rate 
 Discount rates (per annum) 
Time into the future 1% 2% 4% 6% 8%
100 years  $369.71 $138.03 $19.80 $2.95 $0.45
200 years $136.69 $19.05 $0.39 $0.01 <$0.01
Much of the debate focuses on whether a descriptive approach (that begins with evidence 
from decisions people make) or a prescriptive approach (that begins with ethical 
considerations) should be taken. There is also debate about whether to use a rate that 
reflects the returns available from alternative investments (the opportunity cost of capital) 
or one based on preferences for consumption over time (the rate of time preference). 
Appendix A examines the arguments for and against these different approaches. 
Stern takes a prescriptive approach to deriving discount rates, based on ethically 
determined preferences regarding consumption over time. The approach is similar to the 
one taken by Cline in his book The Economics of Global Warming (Cline 1992). Cline 
used a discount rate of 1.5 per cent per annum. Not surprisingly, with a discount rate 
similar to Stern’s, Cline also advocated strong action to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. In 1994, Nordhaus published Managing the Global Commons, in which he 
strongly criticised Cline’s approach, arguing that discount rates must be based on market 
interest rates (that is, be descriptive rather than prescriptive). Nordhaus (1994, p. 132) 
concluded ‘from both empirical and theoretical points of view, Cline’s argument for the 
extraordinarily low discount rate is unsupported and unrealistic’. For his own modelling, 
Nordhaus settled on a discount rate of 6 per cent initially, declining slowly over time due 
to an assumption that economic growth slows.2 
More recently, Nordhaus has modified the discount rates he uses for modelling the 
economics of climate change, so that they decline somewhat more steeply over time. This 
decline, however, has only a modest effect because the discount rates are high enough in 
the initial decades to cause all far-future costs and benefits to be discounted to a low 
proportion of their original value. Ackerman and Finlayson (2006, p. 6) report that in 
Nordhaus’ analysis ‘future costs and benefits are marked down by … 97% after 100 years. 
The "hyperbolic" pattern of discount rates after [that] only affects how fast the remaining 
                                                 
2 Nordhaus’ parameter values initially are δ = 3 per cent, η = 1.0 and g = 3 per cent. This 
compares to Stern’s δ = 0.1 per cent, η = 1.0 and g = 1.3 per cent. 
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3% of value vanishes’. Accordingly, even with this revision the differences between 
Nordhaus and Stern (and also Cline) on discounting are still very large. 
Since its release there have been many critiques of the Review’s approach to discounting. 
While some have supported the Review, many of the critiques contend that the discount 
rates used are too low, either because they are below market rates or because they imply 
that current generations should be prepared to make unreasonably large sacrifices for 
future generations that, even with climate change, are expected to be richer. Some of the 
views expressed are summarised in box 5.1. 
It is to be expected that the debate on what discount rates to use to analyse climate change 
will continue. It is not possible to say that Stern (or for that matter, Nordhaus) is 
definitively right or wrong in their selection of discount rates. Based on the discussion in 
appendix A, however, it is possible to draw some conclusions. 
• The Review’s approach to discounting is based on particular ethical judgements about 
intergenerational equity that are not designed to be representative of wider opinion and 
that are different from the judgements of some other climate change analysts. 
Accordingly, it would have been preferable to present a range of results for different 
discount rates. Stern did this belatedly in a postscript to the Review, although the 
highest parameter values included equate to discount rates that are still below those 
advocated by some (see table 5.2). 
• Under the Review’s approach, community wellbeing is claimed to be increased by 
forgoing current consumption in order to make climate-related investments that 
produce benefits in the long term. Whether these investments are superior to alternative 
investments is left unanswered by the analysis. This is one of the main criticisms that 
can be made of prescriptive approaches to discounting in general. 
   





Box 5.1 Views on the Review’s discounting 
Dasgupta supports the Review’s use of a very low δ. He, however, regards η = 1 as 
ethically unattractive as it suggests that ‘the distribution of wellbeing among people 
doesn’t matter much’ (Dasgupta 2006, p. 7). More particularly, he claims it implies that 
the current generation should be prepared to make unreasonably large sacrifices even 
if future generations are expected to be much better off. He suggests that Stern has 
chosen discounting parameter values to yield desired answers. 
Nordhaus reiterates that a descriptive approach based on market interest rates should 
be taken. He also conducts a thought experiment that he says shows that the Review’s 
discounting parameters can lead to ‘absurd’ and ‘bizarre’ results, requiring very large 
sacrifices from the current generation (Nordhaus 2006b).  
De Long regards the Review’s discount rates as probably too low, but he is not sure 
on this. He points out that Stern estimates that each $1 invested today to reduce the 
impact of global warming will improve the state of things in 2200 by $36. The 
proposition that current generations are morally obliged to make such investments (as 
put by Stern) is debateable, but is not ‘absurd’ or ‘bizarre’ (as suggested by Nordhaus) 
(De Long 2006). 
Quiggin argues that Stern’s choice of η is standard and choice of δ is consistent with 
the utilitarian view that all people count equally. He says the existence of 
contradictions, such as the equity premium puzzle, mean that any combination of 
discounting parameter values can be used to derive results that are contrary to most 
people’s judgement. Therefore, that some critics have been able to do this for the 
Review’s parameter values is not persuasive, as any proposition can be derived from a 
contradiction (Quiggin 2006). 
Yohe, Tol & Murphy argue that it was incumbent on the authors of the Review to 
present the results of a sensitivity analysis spanning a range of possible utility discount 
rates in their primary publication (Yohe, Tol and Murphy 2007). 
Weitzman states that the Review ‘predetermines the outcome in favour of strong 
immediate action’ on climate change by selecting discounting parameter values that 
are a theoretically argued lower bound rather than an empirically-plausible estimate of 
representative tastes (Weitzman 2007, p. 27). However, he argues that discount rates 
that are much lower than those conventionally used (but higher than Stern’s) are 
warranted, given uncertainty about which interest rate to use (appendix A). Because 
Weitzman believes that uncertainty and not ethical considerations warrant lower than 
normal discount rates, he says that Stern may be proved right for the wrong reasons. 
Beckerman and Hepburn agree with the Review that market interest rates do not 
provide a satisfactory guide to choosing discount rates for analysing climate change. 
However, they see no reason why these rates should be based on the ethical 
judgements of the authors of the Review. They advocate a more representative 
approach and suggest that this is likely to lead to higher discount rates (Beckerman 
and Hepburn 2007).   
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• Taking a descriptive approach to discounting, as Nordhaus does, tends to guard against 
the adoption of sub-optimal investments. It leaves open, however, whether higher 
yielding investments that could benefit future generations are actually made. Because 
of this it is argued that projects that could have enhanced social welfare may be 
rejected.  
• Work by Weitzman (2007), and Newell and Pizer (2001) focuses on uncertainties 
related to the equity premium puzzle and to market interest rates in the long-term 
future. They argue that such uncertainty can warrant the use of discount rates that are 
lower than those usually associated with a descriptive approach to discounting (but still 
higher than those used in the Review). 
• Some analysts start with the presumption that discount rates used for estimating the 
costs of climate change must be low, because very long term environmental effects are 
important and so must not be trivialised through strong discounting (Cline 1992). 
Environmental considerations are best addressed by appropriately valuing 
environmental goods and services over time and not by altering the discount rate 
(Arrow et al. 1996).  
5.2 Treatment of risk and uncertainty 
As discussed in previous chapters, risk and uncertainty pervade the science and economics 
of climate change. Treatment of risk and uncertainty is, therefore, a major issue. 
The Review’s approach 
As stated by Stern, ‘a major feature of the Review is that the economics of risk is placed at 
the heart of the economics of climate change’ (Stern 2007a). Risk and uncertainty are 
incorporated in at least four ways, as follows. 
1. Six damage cost scenarios, incorporating different assumptions about climate 
sensitivity and impact categories, are modelled. 
2. The cost of uncertain climate catastrophe is estimated and included for some scenarios. 
3. Many model runs are done for each scenario and the results are averaged across all 
runs. 
4. A defined degree of risk aversion is applied in aggregating the damage costs for each 
model run for each scenario.  
This section concentrates on the last two of these, while chapter 3 deals with the first two.  
The Review argues that if the central estimate for warming is used to estimate damage 
costs, as has been done in some modelling exercises, this will tend to produce lower 
   




estimates than if the full range of possible outcomes is considered. This is the case even if 
a neutral attitude to risk is taken. The reason for this is that damage costs are generally 
believed not to be symmetrical as you move above and below the central estimate for 
warming. For example, say that 3°C is the central estimate and 0°C and 6°C the upper and 
lower bounds. The damage costs for 6°C of warming are generally estimated to be higher 
than those for 3°C by a margin that is greater than the difference between the damage costs 
for 3°C and 0°C of warming. The Review takes this asymmetry into account by doing one 
thousand model runs for each scenario and averaging the damage costs across all runs. 
In addition, Stern builds in a defined degree of risk aversion. Under the expected utility 
approach used by Stern, model runs that have higher damage costs than average receive 
greater weighting in aggregation than those that have lower than average damage costs. 
This reflects Stern’s view ‘that society will be willing to pay a premium (insurance) to 
avoid a simple actuarially fair gamble where potential losses and gains are large’ (Stern 
2007c, p. 38). The degree of risk aversion is set by η, the elasticity of the marginal utility 
of consumption — the same parameter used in discounting over time. As discussed above, 
Stern’s gives η a value of 1. 
The influence of these aspects of the Review’s treatment of risk on the damage cost 
estimates is illustrated by Yohe (2006). The Review projects that climate change will 
reduce average global welfare by an amount equivalent to a permanent cut in per-capita 
consumption of at least 5 per cent. Yohe implies that this figure would reduce to around 
4 per cent if damage costs were symmetrical and a risk neutral approach were taken. 
Discussion 
Attempting to take the full range of possible climate outcomes into account in estimating 
damage costs, as the Review does, is preferable to estimating costs for one possible 
outcome, as was done in some previous studies. Further, building in a degree of risk 
aversion appears to be appropriate, given the large stakes at play. Stern essentially treats 
climate change like an insurance problem under which society is prepared to pay a 
premium to avoid potentially large losses. This way of viewing climate change is 
consistent with the approach taken in IC (1991).  
Stern tends to stress the importance of the Review’s approach to risk in explaining why its 
damage cost estimates are higher than those in many other studies. While it is true that 
treatment of risk is a factor, it is a minor one compared to the choice of discount rates. This 
can be seen most clearly by comparing the Review’s findings with those of Nordhaus, as is 
done later in this chapter. Nordhaus also took a relatively sophisticated approach to risk, 
but arrived at much lower estimates of damage costs, due mainly to the use of more 
conventional discount rates.  
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Stern’s approach to risk and uncertainty results in his aggregated damage cost estimates 
being higher than they would be otherwise, mainly because he adds weighting to the 
unlikely but catastrophic tail of the probability distribution. This still allows damage costs 
to be compared directly with mitigation costs in developing objectives for climate change 
policy. By contrast, others advocate setting objectives based solely on the climate risks. 
For example, the EU has an objective to limit the global average temperature change to 
less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels (Stern 2007c). Stern’s approach would appear to 
be preferable in that it allows both costs and benefits to be considered in formulating 
policy objectives.  
One consequence of the Review’s treatment of risk and uncertainty is that it places 
significant importance on the confidence intervals that climatologists and others place on 
their estimates. For example, if, over time, the central estimate of the degree of warming 
remain unchanged, but the confidence interval narrowed, this would tend to reduce damage 
costs as modelled by Stern. 
5.3 Equity weighting 
The Review’s approach 
Climate change is expected to have more severe impacts in developing than developed 
countries, as discussed in chapter 3. The influence of the high damage costs in developing 
countries on aggregate global costs is, naturally enough, muted by the relatively low levels 
of income in these countries. This applies to both market and non-market costs. As an 
example of the latter, the cost of increased mortality is lower in poorer countries because 
these costs are based on willingness to pay, which is obviously affected by income.  
For Stern, there are strong ethical reasons for weighting the impacts on poorer countries 
more strongly. These relate both to concern for those in poverty and the developed world’s 
historic responsibility for GHG emissions. The Review points out that others, such as 
Nordhaus and Boyer, and Tol adopt equity-weighting when aggregating climate change 
damage costs. 
As discussed, the Review sets η equal to 1, which implies that a dollar of income is worth 
more to poor people than rich people. This parameter, therefore, could have been used for 
equity weighting in the Review’s modelling. However, this was not done as it would have 
required calculating utilities separately for each region and then summing them. Stern 
explains that doing this ‘was beyond the scope of this exercise, given the limited time 
available’ (Stern 2007c, p. 182). What he does instead is make a simple adjustment to one 
of the results, based in part on the extent to which equity adjustment increases the damage 
costs reported in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). Stern’s headline result that damage from 
   




climate change may be equivalent to an average reduction in global per-capita 
consumption of up to 20 per cent, now and forever, is the result of this adjustment. The 
unadjusted modelling result was 14.4 per cent. 
Discussion 
An obvious point to make is that rich countries do not generally weight the interests of 
poor countries as highly as Stern advocates. Stern might counter that historic responsibility 
for GHG emissions strengthens the ethical argument for doing so in the case of climate 
change. 
Maddison presents an argument against equity weighting that was not addressed in the 
Review: 
The argument against [the use of equity weights] in this context is that projects to cut 
carbon emissions should not be justified on distributional grounds when it is possible to 
make direct transfers compensating those who stand to lose from implementing or 
failing to implement cuts in GHG emissions. Another way of saying all this is that one 
should at least entertain the possibility that it might at the margin be cheaper to 
compensate the victims of climate change than abate GHG emissions. 
(Maddison 2007, p. 4) 
Most of the Review’s results are not equity-weighted and so those who regard 
equity-weighting as unjustified are able to concentrate only on these.  
5.4 Aggregating the Review’s estimates 
The Review’s approach 
Using the approaches to discounting over time and treatment of risk described above, Stern 
aggregates damage costs to ‘balanced growth equivalents’ (BGEs), rather than the more 
familiar net present value. The Review states:  
… the BGEs calculated here calibrate the expected utility in a particular scenario (with 
many possible paths) in terms of the definite or certain consumption that, if it grew at a 
constant rate, would generate the same expected utility. One can, therefore, think of the 
BGE measure of climate-change costs … as the maximum insurance premium society 
would be prepared to pay, on a permanent basis, to avoid the risk of climate change (if 
society shared the policy-maker’s ethical judgements). (Stern 2007c, p. 185) 
To illustrate, the BGE for the damage costs shown in figure 3.5a is 5.0 per cent and for 
figure 3.5b is 14.4 per cent. To put this another way, if the losses shown in figure 3.5a 
were in prospect then the global community, if it shared the Review’s ethical judgements, 
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should be prepared to pay up to 5.0 per cent of GDP, now and forever, to eliminate them. It 
should be noted that, while the figures end at the year 2200, Stern assumes that GDP will 
continue to be lower than it would have been without climate change after 2200 
(chapter 3). It has been estimated that these post-2200 costs are responsible for more than 
50 per cent of Stern’s BGE estimates (Yohe and Tol 2007). 
The BGEs for all six of Stern’s scenarios are shown in the first column of figures in 
table 5.2. The remaining columns shows the results of sensitivity analysis conducted for a 
postscript to the Review. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the Review essentially dismisses the ‘baseline climate with 
market impacts only’ scenario as being unrealistic. Accordingly, Stern uses the scenario 
assuming baseline climate and including market impacts and the risk of catastrophe as the 
lower bound estimate of damage costs in the Review’s headline conclusion: 
… if we don’t act, the overall costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to 
losing at least 5 per cent of global GDP each year, now and forever. If a wider range of 
risks and impacts is taken into account, the estimates of damage could rise to 
20 per cent of GDP or more. 
In contrast, the costs of action — reducing GHG emissions to avoid the worst impacts 
of climate change — can be limited to around 1 per cent of global GDP each year. … 
So prompt and strong action is clearly warranted. (Stern 2007c, p. xv) 
The upper bound figure of 20 per cent is based on the scenario that assumes high climate 
and all impact categories. As shown in table 5.2, the BGE for this scenario is 14.4 per cent 
— as explained earlier, an adjustment for equity weighting is responsible for increasing 
this to 20 per cent. 
The scenario assuming baseline climate and including all impact categories is described in 
the Review as the central case. Accordingly, the Review’s central case estimate of the cost 
and risks of business-as-usual climate change is that they are equivalent to 10.9 per cent of 
global GDP each year, now and forever (table 5.2). 
   




Table 5.2 The Review’s aggregated damage cost estimates, by scenario 
and set of discounting parametersa 
Balanced growth equivalents (mean) 






(rL = 1.4) 
η = 1.25
(rL = 1.7) 
η = 1.5
(rL = 2.1) 
 δ = 0.5 
(rL = 1.8) 
δ = 1.0 
(rL = 2.3) 
δ = 1.5
(rL = 2.8)
Baseline Market impacts 2.1 na na  na na na
 As above + risk of 
catastrophe 
5.0 3.8 2.9  3.6 2.3 1.4
 As above + 
non-market 
impacts 
10.9 8.7 6.5  8.1 5.2 3.3
High Market impacts 2.5 na na  na na na
 As above + risk of 
catastrophe 
6.9 na na  na na na
 As above + 
non-market 
impacts 
14.4 12.1 10.2  10.6 6.7 4.2
a Where δ is the pure rate of time preference, η is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption and rL is 
the discount rate applying from 2200 onwards. Prior to 2200 discount rates vary across scenarios, paths and 
over time. na not available. 
Source: Stern (2007c). 
As explained in chapter 4, the Review’s mitigation cost estimate of 1 per cent of GDP per 
year is for stabilisation of atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at 500–550 ppm carbon 
dioxide equivalent (CO2e). At least initially this estimate relates to the year 2050. In 
various places (including chapters 9 and 13) the Review suggests that the costs could be 
lower than this initially and only build up to 1 per cent after several decades. Also, most of 
the macroeconomic modelling referred to by the Review shows mitigation costs increasing 
after 2050, as increasingly deep cuts to emissions are required (chapter 4). These potential 
variations in mitigation costs over time are not factored in to the Review’s headline 
conclusions. That is, there is no formal aggregation (discounting etc) of mitigation costs, 
they are simply estimated to be 1 per cent of global GDP per year on an ongoing basis. 
This is a shortcoming of the Review. Aggregation using Stern’s low discount rates may 
have increased the mitigation cost estimate, given the apparent likelihood of costs 
increasing after 2050. 
Discussion 
The Review’s damage cost estimates are much higher than most others 
The Review’s estimates of the aggregated damage costs of climate change are much higher 
than most other estimates. This is most easily seen by comparing estimates of the marginal 
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damage cost of GHGs (referred to in the Review as the social cost of carbon). This is 
because virtually all studies of climate change damage costs include such estimates, while 
most do not report BGEs. The marginal damage cost is the present value of damage costs 
from now into the future of emitting an extra unit of GHGs now. The Review’s central 
case estimate is US$312 per tonne of carbon (or US$85 per tonne of carbon dioxide). This 
compares to a recent estimate by Nordhaus of US$17 per tonne of carbon (Nordhaus 
2006b). From a meta-analysis of 28 studies, Tol (2005) concluded that marginal damage 
costs are unlikely to exceed US$50 per tonne of carbon, although a few of the estimates 
examined were higher than Stern’s. 
The Review’s use of low discount rates is the main reason its aggregated damage costs are 
higher than most other estimates. Nordhaus reports that his estimate of US$17 increases to 
US$159 per tonne if Stern’s discounting parameters are used. In approximate terms, 
Stern’s estimate is 20 times higher than Nordhaus’. Differences in discounting account for 
a ten fold difference, while other factors account for a two fold difference. In Tol’s meta-
analysis the highest estimates tended to be the ones that used low discount rates (Tol 
2005). The sensitivity of the Review’s results to the discount rates used is shown in 
table 5.2. Increasing the pure rate of time preference (δ) from 0.1 to 1.5 per cent results in 
about a three fold decrease in damage costs. 
Further sensitivity analysis is informative  
Some authors and contributors to the Review have published a paper responding to various 
criticisms (Dietz et al 2007). On most issues, this paper defends the analysis presented in 
the Review. However, it appears to accept that some of the criticisms may have some 
validity. On some issues it presents sensitivity analysis to show the effect of changed 
assumptions on the central case estimate. Table 5.3 presents and comments on some of this 
analysis. 
   




Table 5.3 Further sensitivity analysis, relative to Stern’s central case 
damage cost estimatea 





The Review assumes higher 
vulnerability to climate change in 
Africa, India, Southeast Asia and 
Latin America through to 2200. The 
assumption for the sensitivity 
analysis is that vulnerability in 
these regions instantly falls to that 
of the EU in 2100. 
-1.5 The Review has been criticised 
for assuming that vulnerability in 
developing countries remains 
high even after living standards 
increase substantially. The 
reduced vulnerability in the 




The Review extrapolates from the 
IPCC A2 scenario to give a global 
population increasing to 21.5 billion 
by 2200. The assumption for the 
sensitivity analysis is population 
growth that is reduced by 40%. 
-4 The A2 scenario assumes 
population growth that is much 
higher than projections by the 
United Nations and others. The 
lower growth in the sensitivity 






The Review assumes that utility is 
only an aggregate function of total 
consumption. The assumption for 
the sensitivity analysis is that utility 
is a function of both consumption 
and environmental goods (in effect 
increasing the relative price of 
environmental goods).  
+2 There are some reasons for 
expecting that the relative price 
of environmental goods will 
increase if per capita income 
increases and the environment 
deteriorates due to climate 
change. However, it is unclear 
whether the size of the change 
made for the sensitivity analysis 
is appropriate. 
a Formal sensitivity analysis was conducted for ‘adaptive capacity’ only. The other results are described as 
‘back-of-the-envelope’ calculations. Note that the effect of varying several parameters at once will not be 
additive. 
Source: Dietz et al (2007); comments are by the authors of this paper. 
Not all of the damage costs can be avoided by mitigation 
In its conclusions, the Review compares estimates of total damage costs with mitigation 
costs. As has been pointed out by some critics, this is not the correct way to frame the issue 
(Yohe and Tol 2007). Mitigation costs should be compared with the damage costs they are 
expected to avoid, so as to predict whether there are net benefits from action. 
While the Review’s conclusions are open to this criticism, the necessary information is 
provided in chapter 13. Stern’s mitigation costs are based on stabilisation of atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs at 500–550 ppm carbon dioxide equivalent (this choice of 
stabilisation target is discussed in the next chapter). For the central case, Stern estimates 
damage costs with stabilisation at the top of this range as equivalent to a 1.1 per cent 
reduction in GDP now and forever. Subtracting this from 10.9 per cent of GDP, which is 
the BGE for business-as-usual emissions, gives an avoided damage cost equivalent to 
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9.8 per cent of GDP. Accordingly, the difference between total and avoided damage costs 
is not large and does not make a material difference to the Review’s conclusions.  
Cost-benefit analysis for climate change has limitations 
The task undertaken by the Review involved modelling humanity’s expected welfare from 
now to infinity, with and without climate change, and in the presence of great uncertainty 
about the impacts of climate change. This is, to put it mildly, a difficult task. Stern states 
that because of uncertainty about scientific and economic possibilities, models examining 
climate change:  
… should be treated with great circumspection. There is a danger that, because they are 
quantitative, they will be taken too literally. They should not be. They are only one part 
of an argument. But they can, and do, help us to gain some understanding of the size of 
the risks involved, an issue that is at the heart of the economics of climate change. 
(Stern 2007c, p. 163) 
Tol is even more cautious about the economic modelling of climate change: 
… it is as yet unclear whether our research findings [on costs and benefits] are superior 
to our gut feeling. Having worked in the field for 15 years, I do not know. 
(Tol 2006, p. 2) 
In Stern’s view, another important part of the part of the argument is an appreciation of the 
disaggregated risks and damages of climate change: 
It is the scale of these risks and an appreciation of the types and severity of damages 
involved that provide the main case for urgent and strong action to stabilize emissions 
below 550 ppm CO2e, when one considers that the risks can be very substantially 
reduced by an expenditure of around 1% of GDP per year. (Stern 2007c, p. 650) 
However, Stern does not develop this argument in any formal sense, and it is difficult to 
see how this could be done in a way that was superior to a cost-benefit analysis. It would 
seem that there is little choice but to try to improve efforts at cost-benefit analysis, 
recognising the great uncertainties that exist.  
Weitzman (2007) suggests that the greatest uncertainty in the economics of climate change 
is which discount rate to use. On this issue, Quiggin arrives at the following conclusion: 
The real difficulty here is that we are pushing economic analysis to its limits, in an area 
where fundamental problems, such as the equity premium puzzle remain unresolved. 
Economists can help to define the issues, but it is unlikely that economics can provide a 
final answer. (Quiggin 2006, p. 18) 
   





Because climate change mitigation incurs costs now for benefits that are expected mainly 
in the very long term future, the choice of discount rates is critical. Uncertainty over the 
damage costs of climate change, and the likely distribution of these costs across people 
with different incomes, leads to further important aggregation issues. 
Ethical considerations inevitably come into the choice of aggregation factors for climate 
change. Different ethical perspectives lead to very different results and policy 
prescriptions. 
There are some plausible arguments for selecting discount rates for analysing climate 
change that are lower than those used in many other contexts. Even allowing for this, the 
rates used in the Review are low. The discount rates used in the Review are based on the 
authors’ ethical judgements and are not designed to be representative of community 
preferences. 
Stern builds a degree of risk aversion into the analysis. This is perhaps appropriate, given 
the large stakes at play. 
The Review’s headline conclusion (after aggregation) is that business-as-usual emissions 
involves costs and risks that are equivalent to losing at least 5 per cent, and up to 20 per 
cent, of global GDP, now and forever. These damage cost estimates are considerably 
higher than most others, and the use of low discount rates is the main reason for this. It 
appears that the discount rates used by the Review are around 1.4 per cent per annum. 
Adding one percentage point to the discount rates reduces the cost estimates by more than 
half. 
Not all of the damage costs can be prevented. The Review concludes that mitigation 
actions costing 1 per cent of global GDP (+/- 3 per cent) each year could reduce damage 
costs to around one tenth of those for business-as-usual emissions. 
There are great scientific and economic uncertainties in estimating aggregate damage and 
mitigation costs for climate change, including which discount rate to use. 
 
 
   




6 Climate change policy 
The second half of the Review covers mitigation and adaptation policy as well as 
international collective action. This part of the Review has received much less comment 
than the estimates of damage and mitigation costs. This chapter gives a broad overview of 
this material, selecting some important issues for more detailed discussion.  
6.1 Policy objective 
In 1992, the international community of states adopted the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Its objective is ‘to achieve … stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system’. Stabilisation ‘should be achieved 
within a timeframe sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to 
ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to 
proceed in a sustainable manner’ (UNFCCC, Article 2).  
However, this objective, almost universally accepted now with 190 countries having 
ratified the UNFCCC, has been criticised as being insufficient to guide climate change 
policies. Stern and other analysts have proposed overall objectives for climate change 
policy based on estimates of the cost, benefits and risks. 
The Review’s approach 
The Review emphasises the importance of developing a common understanding of the goal 
of climate change policy at the global level: 
The benefits of a shared understanding include creating consensus on the scale of the 
problem and a common appreciation of the size of the challenge for both mitigation and 
adaptation. It would provide a foundation for discussion of mutual responsibilities in 
tackling the challenge. (Stern 2007c, p. 324)   
Mitigation objective 
The objective set for climate change mitigation could be in terms of temperature increases, 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) or cumulative emissions over a 
period. Stern opts for stabilisation of atmospheric concentrations, as this allows policy-
   
70 THE STERN REVIEW: 




makers to monitor progress in a timely fashion (unlike temperature increases, which are 
believed to lag human causation). Stabilisation implies that emissions will need to be 
reduced to very low levels in the long-term, as explained in box . 
 
Box 6.1 What does stabilisation mean? 
Climate change is a ‘stock externality’. This means that the temperature increase is 
determined by the stock, or concentration, of GHGs in the atmosphere. Since some 
gases have a long lifetime in the atmosphere (for example, 5 to 200 years for CO2 and 
up to 3 200 years for sulphur hexafluoride), emissions over a long time horizon 
contribute to the stock. 
The change in the stock of GHGs depends on the gap between emissions and the 
Earth’s natural capacity to remove them from the atmosphere.  
This implies that stabilisation of the atmospheric concentration of GHGs (and of 
temperature increases) ultimately requires a reduction of emissions to the level of the 
absorptive capacity of the biosphere. Emissions currently are in the order of 40 to 
45 gigatonnes (Gt) carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) per annum. The natural 
absorptive capacity is around 5 Gt CO2e per annum (Stern 2007c). Thus, stabilisation 
would require global emissions to be reduced by more than 80 per cent in the long run.   
 
A clear implication of the scientific consensus that anthropogenic GHG emissions are very 
likely to have caused increases in global temperature is that further increases in 
temperature (and thus the damages from climate change) will depend on atmospheric 
concentrations. The Review says that the optimal stabilisation level for atmospheric 
concentrations can be chosen by comparing the marginal costs and benefits of changing the 
level. However, Stern points out that there are some difficulties in applying this approach, 
including: 
• the uncertainties surrounding climate science, climate-change damages and mitigation 
costs 
• the uncertainty about socioeconomic and technological development over the long time 
horizon 
• the ethical judgements that must be made concerning the weighting of damages over 
time and across countries. 
The Review concludes that ‘given the uncertainty about both sides of the ledger, this 
approach cannot pin down a precise number but can … suggest a range in which it should 
lie.’ (Stern 2007c, p. 328) 
The approach taken in the Review for deriving a target range is illustrated in figure . Under 
certainty, the optimal level would be determined by the intersection of the marginal cost 
and benefit curves. Under uncertainty high and low estimates for these curves can be 
   




identified. The upper range for the stabilisation target is determined by the most optimistic 
outcome for climate impacts (low estimate of impacts) and the most pessimistic case of 
mitigation costs (high estimates of mitigation costs) and vice versa for the lower bound. 
Figure 6.1 Schematic representation of how to select a stabilisation level  
Source: Stern (2007c). 
The stabilisation range 
Stern suggests a range for the stabilisation target of 450 to 550 ppm CO2e. This is justified 
by identifying ‘turning points’ — concentrations at which the damage and mitigation costs 
are expected to increase rapidly: 
… stabilisation at levels below 450 ppm CO2e would require immediate, substantial 
and rapid cuts in emissions that are likely to be extremely costly, whereas stabilisation 
above 550 ppm CO2e would imply climatic risks that are very large and likely to be 
generally viewed as unacceptable. (Stern 2007c, p. 219)  
Based on both the disaggregated analysis of climate change impacts and the modelling of 
overall costs, the Review finds that damage costs increase steeply as concentrations 
increase beyond 550 ppm CO2e. The argument in essence, is that costs are likely to 
increase gradually up to a 2°C temperature increase (relative to the pre-industrial era), but 
increase rapidly beyond that. Above 4–5°C ‘the risks of experiencing some extremely 
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damaging phenomena [such as the deaths of hundreds of millions of people due to food 
and water shortages] begin to become significant’ (Stern 2007c, p. 331). Based on IPCC 
(2001c), at 550 ppm CO2e there is a 9 per cent chance of exceeding a 4°C increase in 
temperature and a 2 per cent chance of exceeding 5°C (the Review quotes higher 
probabilities based on some more recent scientific studies). 
For mitigation costs, Stern points out that achieving stabilisation at 450 ppm CO2e would 
be difficult as it may involve replacing existing capital stock ahead of schedule. The high 
structural adjustment costs and possible social instability associated with very rapid cuts in 
emissions are discussed. 
The Review estimates that stabilising atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at 500–
550 ppm CO2e would involve ongoing mitigation costs equivalent to 1 per cent of GDP 
(+/- 3 per cent). Even taking the upper bound, this is less than the benefits as estimated for 
the Review’s central case: 
Our work with the PAGE model suggests that, allowing for uncertainty, if the world 
stabilises at 550 ppm CO2e, climate change impacts could have an effect equivalent to 
reducing consumption today and forever by about 1.1%. … this compares with around 
11% in the corresponding ‘business as usual’ case [baseline climate, all impact 
categories] – ten times as high. (Stern 2007c, p. 333) 
That is, a cost of -2 to 4 per cent of GDP now and forever produces benefits equivalent to 
around 10 per cent of GDP, now and forever. On this basis, stabilisation at 550 ppm CO2e 
is clearly better than doing nothing. It is also implied that 550 ppm CO2e is a preferable 
stabilisation target than 650 ppm CO2e, as the equivalent consumption loss estimated for 
the latter is 0.6 per cent higher (although no estimate of the reduction in mitigation cost 
associated with the less stringent target is given).  
The Review argues that, given the uncertainties, ‘any long-term goal would need to be kept 
under review and adjusted as scientific and economic understanding developed’ (Stern 
2007c, p. 318). 
Pathway to stabilisation 
The targeted stabilisation level does not determine the time path for emissions. For 
example, stabilisation at 550 ppm CO2e (without ‘overshooting’) would require global 
emissions to peak sometime in the next 10–20 years and then fall by around 1–3 per cent 
per year. The earlier the peak, the lower the required rate of reduction thereafter. And the 
less stringent the target, the more flexibility there is as to the time path. The pathways to 
stabilisation suggested in the Review are shown toward the end of this chapter in figure . It 
is not clear how these were derived as no optimisation exercise was undertaken. The main 
message is that achieving an early peak is difficult given the current trajectory of 
emissions, but has benefits in terms of reductions in subsequent mitigation costs. 
   




‘Overshooting’ refers to exceeding an atmospheric concentration target for a period, but 
eventually achieving the target. This would require global emissions to be less than the 
natural absorptive capacity of the biosphere for an extended period. Because of the radical 
cuts in emissions required, Stern says that it would be unwise to assume that any overshoot 
could be clawed back. And even if it were possible: 
overshooting entails increased risks of climate change, by increasing the chances of 
triggering extreme events associated with higher concentration levels than the goal, and 
amplifying feedbacks on concentration levels.’ (Stern 2007c, p. 340) 
Adaptation 
The Review discusses the role of adaptation in reducing the damage costs of climate 
change but does not formulate an adaptation objective. The Review’s approach to 
adaptation is discussed in section 6.3. 
Discussion 
The Review reports on the results of studies that have used integrated assessment models 
to estimate the amount of mitigation that maximises benefits less costs.  
• Nordhaus and Boyer (1999) found that the optimal global mitigation effort reduces 
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide from 557ppm in 2100 
(business-as-usual) to 538ppm. This reduces the global mean temperature from an 
estimated 2.42°C above 1900 levels to 2.33°C. 
• Tol (1997) found that the optimal mitigation effort reduces the global mean 
temperature in 2100 from around 4°C above 1990 levels to between around 3.6°C 
and 3.9°C, depending on whether countries cooperate and on the costs of 
mitigation. 
• Manne et al. (1995) did not use their model to find the optimal reduction in 
emissions, but the policy option they explored that delivers the highest net benefits 
reduces atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide from around 800 ppm in 
2100 to around 750 ppm, reducing global mean temperature from around 3.25°C 
above 1990 levels to around 3°C. (Stern 2007c, p. 337) 
The striking thing about these results is how modest the recommended emission reductions 
are compared to those in the Review. The main reason for this is that these studies estimate 
business-as-usual damage costs from climate change to be relatively low (in present value 
terms). This in turn is due mainly, but not entirely, to the use of higher discount rates than 
those used by Stern (as discussed in chapter 5). In addition, the Review advocates a 
‘flatter’ time path for emission reductions compared to the ‘policy ramp’ proposed by 
Nordhaus and others who use more traditional discount rates (Barker 2007). The studies 
also vary in their assumptions about the likely growth in atmospheric concentrations of 
GHGs under business-as-usual.  
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Another point of difference is that while the Review proposes a stabilisation target range, 
these other studies do not. Presumably, for these analysts decisions about stabilisation 
should be left to the longer term future. It is also the case that Nordhaus and Boyer, and 
Tol derive the optimal amount of mitigation within their modelling, while the Review takes 
a heuristic approach. Stern’s contention is that optimisation analysis ‘would demand too 
much of formal modelling and probabilistic forecasts, which project hundreds of years into 
the future’ (Dietz et al 2007, p. 168). 
The above studies were all published in the 1990s. Some more recent work shows higher 
levels of mitigation to be optimal. For example, Nordhaus’ most recent results using the 
DICE model are that the optimal global mitigation effort reduces atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide from 683 ppm in 2100 to 588 ppm (a reduction of 95 
ppm, compared to the reduction of 19 ppm quoted above) (Nordhaus 2007). Despite this, 
the difference between the amount of mitigation proposed by Stern and that proposed by 
Nordhaus remains large. Both agree, however, that policies that go far beyond current 
global emissions reductions are warranted (Nordhaus 2006b). 
6.2 Mitigation policy 
Chapters 14–17 of the Review are devoted to various aspects of mitigation policy. 
The Review’s approach 
The Review gives the essential elements of climate change mitigation policy as: 
• an emissions price 
• technology policy 
• policies to address barriers to behavioural change. 
It argues that leaving out any of these elements will significantly increase the mitigation 
costs.  
Emissions price 
Of the three elements, the Review places most emphasis on emissions pricing, which it 
says could be achieved explicitly through taxes or tradeable quotas, or implicitly through 
regulation. The Review argues that emissions pricing needs to have the following 
characteristics. 
• Environmental effectiveness — the trajectory of emissions prices over time should be 
consistent with achieving the policy objective.  
   




• Efficiency — the price signal should reflect the marginal damage cost caused by 
emissions, and rise over time to reflect the increasing damages as the stock of GHGs 
grows. 
• Cost-effectiveness — emissions prices should be, as far as practicable, equivalent 
across sectors, GHGs and countries. A degree of price stability is also required to 
achieve cost-effectiveness over time. 
• Credibility — firms must believe that emissions prices will endure before they fully 
factor them into long-term investment decisions, such as those relating to power 
stations, and research and development into low-emissions technologies. 
• Flexibility — the pricing policy should be able to change in response to new 
information. 
• Predictability — there need to be clear revision rules that set out the circumstances and 
procedures under which the pricing policy would change.  
The Review discusses the likely impacts on industrial location if countries move at 
different speeds on emissions pricing (or other mitigation policies). The conclusion is that 
this is unlikely to be a major problem because there are generally more important 
determinants of firm location, such as workforce characteristics and access to technologies 
and infrastructure. 
Technology policy 
The Review acknowledges that in ‘the absence of any other market failures, introducing a 
fully credible carbon price path … would theoretically be enough to encourage suitable 
technologies to develop’ (Stern 2007c, p. 394). It goes on to say, however, that these 
conditions do not hold in practice, because: 
• innovation produces spillover benefits and this causes it to be undersupplied  
• it is not possible to achieve 100 per cent credibility for emissions pricing, particularly 
initially 
• private sector firms and capital markets may be unwilling to take the risks associated 
with developing a new technology over an extended period (leading to ‘lock-in’ of 
existing technologies) 
• there are subsidies for fossil fuel use, particularly in developing countries, and these 
discourage the development of low-emission technologies 
• the nature of competition within some markets is not conducive to innovation (due to 
the existence of only one or a few firms and/or a risk that government regulation will 
prevent innovators from reaping the full benefits of innovation). 
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Accordingly, Stern sees an important role for policies to support technological innovation. 
The aim of policy being to bring a portfolio of low-emission technologies to commercial 
viability, not to simply focus on those closest to commercialisation. 
The Review considers policies to promote research, development and demonstration 
separately from those to promote deployment. On the former, the Review regards 
governments as having an important role in directly funding skills and basic knowledge 
creation for science and technology. While advocating governments be cautious about 
picking winners, energy storage, photovoltaics, biofuel conversion, fusion, material science 
and carbon capture and storage are identified as areas with large potential. It is 
recommended that global public energy funding be doubled, to around US$20 billion per 
year. 
The Review says that there are strong arguments for governments supporting the 
deployment of low-emissions technologies. This can be done through various means 
including subsidies, quota-based schemes and price support mechanisms (Australian 
examples include the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target scheme and subsidies for 
rooftop solar electricity generation). It is suggested that deployment incentives for 
low-emissions technologies be increased two to five times from current levels of around 
US$33 billion per year. 
Barriers to behavioural change 
The Review says that even if emissions pricing and support for the development of 
technology are introduced, ‘barriers and market imperfections may still inhibit action, 
particularly on energy efficiency’ (Stern 2007c, p. 427). For example, households and 
firms sometimes do not take up energy efficiency opportunities even when it would be cost 
effective for them to do so. Stern argues that both standard economic theory, and systems 
and behavioural theories of decision making are relevant to understanding the barriers to 
behavioural change. 
The Review is generally supportive of policy responses to these barriers, although it points 
out that there can be hidden costs and benefits that mean that some energy efficiency 
opportunities may not be as attractive as they might appear. Policy measures identified as 
having potential include: 
• minimum energy performance standards for buildings, appliances and cars 
• labels, certificates and endorsement to raise the visibility of energy costs in investment 
decisions (for example, for domestic lighting, consumer electronics, white goods, 
electric motors, boilers, air conditioners and office equipment) 
• requiring that customers be provided with informative energy bills, real time electricity 
displays and/or smart meters to enable them to better manage their energy use 
   




• integrated land-use planning to reduce transport demand 
• simplifying planning rules for the installation of micro-generation technologies 
• measures to raise the energy efficiency of government operations 
• government initiated education, persuasion and discussion to shape preferences and 
behaviours.  
Discussion 
The Review provides an informative discussion of many mitigation policy issues. It argues 
that both economic principles and national circumstances (including political institutions 
and traditions) should inform the design of mitigation policy. Accordingly, there is a 
tendency not to be prescriptive on the choices individual countries should make. This is 
consistent with Stern’s desire to build a coalition for action. Ultimately, the Review seems 
more concerned with being critical of inaction than criticising the types of action various 
countries might choose to take. Because of this, some opportunities to draw a distinction 
between good and bad policy are missed. 
The arguments presented on policy design are generally grounded in mainstream economic 
thought. On some questions, however, the position taken conflicts with the views of some 
other analysts. Some of the most important of these are considered below.  
Emissions trading or emissions taxes? 
This issue has both an international and a national dimension. An international framework 
for action on climate change could be based on either emissions trading or an emissions 
tax. Under a framework based on emissions trading, participating countries take on an 
emissions ‘cap’ or ‘target’. This can be met through reducing emissions within the country 
or purchasing rights to emit from other countries. An emissions tax would be levied by 
individual countries at an internationally harmonised level.  
If an internationally harmonised tax were introduced, participating countries would not 
have a choice as to the policy instrument they use at the national level. An international 
emissions trading framework, however, does allow participating countries the freedom to 
achieve their targets with whatever instruments they deem appropriate. A policy package 
could comprise national or international firm-level emissions trading, emissions taxes, 
support for research and development, subsidies or command and control measures (PC 
2007). 
This policy flexibility at the national level is one of the main reasons that the Review 
supports an international framework being based on emissions trading. The Review is not 
prescriptive about which policy instruments should be used at the national level, arguing 
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that the choice should be influenced by national circumstances. Those that prefer an 
internationally harmonised emissions tax, such as Nordhaus (2006a) and Stiglitz (2006), 
see price stability as one of the main considerations. With a tax the emissions price is 
controlled, whereas with trading emissions are controlled and the emissions price may rise 
to levels that impose high costs on the economy. 
Another group of analysts have proposed ‘hybrid schemes’ that combine qualities of both 
emissions trading and emissions taxes (Roberts and Spence 1976; Weitzman 1978; Kopp et 
al. 1997; McKibbin and Wilcoxen 1997; Jacoby and Ellerman 2002). These are essentially 
emissions trading schemes that set a ceiling to the permit price. 
A discussion of the various economic efficiency, equity and political reasons for preferring 
one approach over the others at the international and national levels is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. Interested readers can find such a discussion in PC (2007).  
How should the credibility of pricing policy be established? 
Like Stern, many other analysts also stress the importance of establishing the credibility of 
emissions pricing policy. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2006, p. 2), for example, state: 
… the actions that individuals and firms will need to undertake in order to reduce 
emissions involve enormous investments in capital equipment and research and 
development, both with long payback periods. A climate policy will be unable to 
induce such investments unless it is clear that the policy is likely to be enforced, and is 
unlikely to be repealed. The single most important characteristic of a climate policy, in 
other words, is to provide a solid foundation for large, long-term investments by the 
private sector. 
Helm, Hepburn and Mash (2003) argue that climate change policy is prone to a lack of 
credibility because governments face a time-inconsistency problem. That is, because of 
conflicting objectives, they have an incentive to renege on climate policy commitments 
once investment costs are sunk. Knowing this, firms may decide not to invest in emissions 
reduction. For example, where a government has announced both an emissions reduction 
target and an objective to keep energy prices low, firms may consider it likely that the 
latter will eventually take precedence and, therefore, view the climate change target as 
non-credible. 
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2006) illustrate the importance of policy credibility. They show 
that if a permit to emit one tonne of carbon costs $20, a firm may be prepared to invest up 
to $400 to reduce their annual permit requirements by one. However, if the firm believes 
that there is a 10 per cent chance each year that the policy will be repealed the investment 
incentive can drop by two-thirds, to $133. 
   




While many analysts recognise the importance of this issue, they are divided on how best 
to deal with it.   
The Review advocates building the credibility of emissions pricing by setting long-term 
emissions targets (with clear revision rules), avoiding destabilising influences (such as 
premature inclusion of forestry offsets in carbon markets) and encouraging stakeholder 
support for policy. It considers that whether emissions trading is more or less credible than 
emissions taxes is not clear, and depends on national circumstances. There is a need to 
recognise that, whatever the instrument, establishing credibility will take time and so 
‘[d]uring the transition period, governments should consider how to deal with investments 
in long-lived assets which risk locking economies into a high-carbon trajectory’ (Stern 
2007c, p. 368). The emphasis that the Review places on technology and energy efficiency 
policy is motivated in part by the belief that it will take time to establish the credibility of 
emissions pricing.  
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2006, p. 3) argue that establishing the credibility of climate 
change policy requires creating: 
… a constituency with a strong financial interest in perpetuation of the policy. Bluntly 
put, it must create a powerful lobby group that will vigorously resist any attempt at 
backsliding by future governments. 
They regard emissions taxes as having the opposite effect, as all future users of fossil fuels 
would be motivated to lobby against them. The policy they advocate is a form of emissions 
trading with a ‘safety valve’ on price (often referred to as a hybrid system). A distinctive 
feature of their proposal is that there be no international trade in emission permits. One 
reason they see such trade as undesirable is because poor monitoring and compliance in 
one country could debase the entire global trading system. Without trading, any such 
problems would be confined to individual countries. Further, within each country the 
constituency of permit holders would pressure their government to enforce compliance and 
monitor vigilantly in order to maintain the market value of permits. In their view, not 
allowing international trade increases the credibility of emissions pricing and this 
advantage outweighs the potential gains from trade.  
Montgomery and Smith (2005) essentially see the credibility problem of emission pricing 
as unsolvable. They regard the main task for climate change policy as creating the 
conditions necessary for the development of new low-emissions technologies. They argue 
that emissions pricing policies are unable to create these conditions: 
What the literature has failed to recognise is the impossibility of creating a credible 
announcement of a future [emissions] limit or carbon price at a level sufficient to 
motivate research and development investment by the private sector. (Montgomery and 
Smith 2005, p. 17) 
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They stress that, for efficiency reasons, emissions prices should start off at a low level and 
increase substantially over time. In the case of an emissions tax, they regard future 
increases sufficient to stimulate the necessary research and development now as 
non-credible. This is because governments will always have an incentive to not proceed 
with planned increases once innovation has occurred. For emissions trading, they argue 
that competition will drive permit prices down to a level that does not allow innovators to 
recoup their investment. Accordingly, Montgomery and Smith argue that government 
support for research and development should be the main focus of climate change policy, 
with emissions pricing given only a minor role (this is sometimes referred to as a 
‘technology-push’ approach) . 
In considering national climate change policy, Helm, Hepburn and Mash (2003) propose 
an institutional solution to the issue of credibility. They point out the time-inconsistency 
problem at play is also found in other areas, including monetary policy. They say that the 
lessons that have been learned from the setting of monetary targets and interest rates 
provide useful insights for climate change policy. For monetary policy, the delegation to an 
independent central bank is the conventional solution. For climate change policy, they 
advocate the creation of an energy agency with two objectives — meeting a GHG 
emissions target (possibly with the policy instrument specified by the government) and a 
security-of-supply target (possibly using a capacity payment instrument). 
Another theme in the literature is that policy credibility is unlikely to be higher than the 
credibility of the science of climate change (Montgomery and Smith 2005). If people have 
strong doubts that climate change will prove to be as big a threat as forecast, they will tend 
not to base their long-term decisions on the premise that emissions prices will rise over 
time. Similarly, policy credibility in an individual country is dependent on the credibility 
of international policy. This is because it is unlikely that a government would continue to 
increase national mitigation costs in the absence of effective policies in other countries. In 
fact, some governments signal this in advance by making their long-term emission targets 
conditional on commensurate international efforts. 
If emissions pricing and support for research and development are introduced, is 
deployment support also required? 
As discussed above, the Review recommends that governments give considerable support 
to the deployment of low emission technologies, in addition to emissions pricing and 
support for research and development. This contrasts with some other analysts who regard 
the rationale for deployment support as weak (Montgomery and Smith 2005; Nordhaus 
2004). 
The Review argues that even where a new technology has the potential to become cost 
effective in time, it may not be deployed because firms (and/or capital markets) are 
   




unwilling to bear the ‘learning costs’ in the initial years (learning costs being how much 
more the new technology costs than the existing technology). This is described as ‘an 
industry version of a collective action problem with its associated free rider issues’ (Stern 
2007c, p. 397). This problem, it is argued, can lead to ‘lock-in’ of existing technologies. 
Stern maintains that the power generation sector is particularly prone to technology lock-in 
due to high learning costs, the nature of the distribution infrastructure, subsidies to fossil 
fuel use and other factors. 
The appropriate response, according to the Review, is for governments to increase support 
for the deployment of low emission technologies so as to promote learning-by-doing. It 
suggests that globally this support be around US$91 billion in 2015 and US$163 billion in 
2025. This implies that deployment support would be the main component of climate 
change policy for the next decade or more, with emissions pricing taking over this position 
after that (Anderson 2006).  
The argument for government deployment support can only be valid if two conditions 
hold. First, there must be a reasonable expectation that valuable learning will be realised. 
Montgomery and Smith conclude that this is not the case at present because: 
… the needed technologies simply do not exist today, so that learning-by-doing with 
existing technologies will not contribute to development or reduction in the cost of the 
needed technology. (Montgomery and Smith 2005, p. 16) 
They argue that near term emission reductions are best achieved through the increased 
deployment of mature technologies, such as electricity generation using gas rather than 
coal. And that support for low-emission technologies should be directed to research and 
development, rather than deployment. If their view is correct, the net result of having 
deployment support in addition to a cap-and-trade scheme would be higher mitigation 
costs. 
The second necessary condition is that there must be some substantial market failure, 
amenable to government correction, that prevents firms from appropriating the value 
obtained from learning. The Review argues that there is, but this view is contested. 
Nordhaus for example, maintains that the historical evidence is that learning-by-doing is 
largely firm-specific. For this and other reasons he concludes that at present ‘it would be 
folly to rely upon learning-by-doing to rationalise a costly or critical component of climate 
change policy’ (Nordhaus 2004). 
It is not clear whether Stern regards a strong reliance on deployment policy as ideal, or 
simply necessary given current arrangements and political constraints on policy choices in 
various countries. What is clear is that deployment support has the potential to increase 
mitigation costs significantly and unnecessarily (PC 2007). Accordingly, any proposal for 
its use should be thoroughly evaluated.  
   
82 THE STERN REVIEW: 




6.3 Adaptation policy 
The Review includes three chapters that cover various aspects of adaptation. 
The Review’s approach 
The definition of adaptation used by the Review is ‘any adjustment in natural or human 
systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli, or their effects, which 
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities’ (IPCC 2001a). According to the 
Review, adaptation is the only way to deal with the unavoidable impacts of climate change 
to which the world is already committed. However, although adaptation can mute climate 
change impacts, it cannot entirely remove them, and it incurs costs. The relative 
effectiveness of adaptation is expected to diminish and its cost to increase as the magnitude 
and speed of climate change increases. Hence, the Review argues that without early and 
strong mitigation the costs of adaptation will rise sharply and residual climate change 
damage after adaptation will be large.  
The Review points out that an important difference between adaptation and mitigation is 
the incidence and timing of benefits — adaptation provides local benefits without long lag 
times, whereas mitigation provides global benefits which take longer to arise. As such, 
some adaptation is expected to occur autonomously. However, there are barriers that may 
hinder autonomous human adaptation. Those discussed include: 
• uncertainty and imperfect information about climate change projections, which makes 
it difficult to assess the costs and benefits of adaptation 
• missing and misaligned markets (including public goods), which make it difficult to 
assure those paying the current costs of adaptation that they will reap the full benefits  
• financial constraints to upfront investment. 
The Review argues that, in developed countries, governments have a role to play in 
addressing these barriers in four key areas. 
• The provision and effective communication of high-quality information, particularly 
improved regional climate predictions.  
• Land-use planning and performance standards (for example, structural requirements for 
new buildings) to encourage proper pricing of climate change risk into long-term 
investment decisions.  
• Long-term policies for climate-sensitive public and publicly-provided goods, for 
example, natural resource and flood protection, to avoid significant public liability if 
disaster recovery and public safety costs rise sharply.  
   




• Financial support for the poorest in society, particularly if risk-based insurance systems 
are in place that may be unaffordable for those on low incomes. (The Review is not 
optimistic about the insurance industry’s ability to bear sharply rising damage costs.) 
The Review argues that the foundation of adaptation policy in developing countries should 
be good development policy. This involves: 
• promoting development broadly (for example, through economic diversification and 
investment in health and education) 
• enhancing resilience to disasters and improving disaster preparedness and management  
• promoting risk sharing approaches through insurance and pooling of disaster risks (and 
encouraging private sector involvement in these areas) 
• developing social safety nets. 
The Review also discusses the role of new policies to encourage adaptation by private 
agents in developing countries. Similar policies to those required in developed countries 
will be needed (outlined above). However, their application will differ due to development 
constraints.  
Discussion 
Most of the Review’s conclusions regarding adaptation policy are uncontentious. In 
particular, it is generally agreed that it is optimal to use both adaptation and mitigation 
strategies in responding to climate change (Ingham et al 2005; McKibbin and Wilcoxen 
2003; Tol et al 1998).1 The IPCC notes: 
Even the most stringent mitigation efforts cannot avoid further impacts of climate 
change in the next few decades, which makes adaptation essential … Unmitigated 
climate change would, in the long term, be likely to exceed the capacity of natural, 
managed and human systems to adapt. (IPCC 2007a, p. 20) 
It is also generally agreed that the market failures associated with adaptation are less 
pervasive than those for mitigation. This is because adaptation delivers local benefits that 
can often be appropriated by those taking the action. Further, to the extent that government 
intervention is required, action can be effectively taken at the national level.  
One area of contention is whether policy frameworks for mitigation and adaptation should 
be integrated or treated as separate. According to McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2003), 
                                                 
1 In the literature, adaptation and mitigation are often referred to as being ‘complementary’. 
Ingham et al (2005) show that in economic terms, adaptation and mitigation are substitutes. 
Only when the effect of mitigation on marginal adaptation cost is strong are mitigation and 
adaptation complements (that is, increasing mitigation costs reduces both mitigation and 
adaptation). 
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institutions, regulations and markets should be designed in such a way as to deliver 
appropriate incentives to reduce climate change impacts through abatement as well as 
adaptation — policies such as mandated abatement targets will only give appropriate 
outcomes ‘by accident’, as the trade-off between abatement and adaptation is not dealt 
with. Ingham (2006) notes that, in determining the optimal level of mitigation, an 
assumption about the level of adaptation needs to be made. However, it should not be 
assumed that this is the optimal level of adaptation — the two should be determined jointly 
on the basis of relative costs and benefits. Wilbanks et al (2003) argue that integrating 
research into, and policy analysis of, mitigation and adaptation will provide protection at 
lower cost, due to the ‘synergies’ created. On the other hand, Berkhout (2005) argues that 
differences between the two policies pose challenges for their integration,2 and 
Klein et al. (2003) conclude that the two policies should be kept separate — focusing on 
integration will encounter institutional complexity that could limit the policies’ efficacy. 
Although the Review argues that mitigation and adaptation should go ‘hand-in-hand’, it 
does not discuss an integrated policy framework.  
6.4 International collective action 
International collective action receives considerable attention in the Review, with seven 
chapters devoted to it. 
The Review’s approach 
As mentioned previously, the Review identifies three essential elements of climate change 
mitigation policy — an emissions price, technology policy and action to address barriers to 
energy efficiency. Achieving these elements of policy on a global scale will require 
international collective action. The Review sets out some of the desirable features of 
collective action. Particular emphasis is placed on methods to encourage participation, and 
on prospective burden-sharing arrangements between developed and developing countries. 
Also discussed is the potential to build on existing arrangements for international action on 
climate change. 
According to the Review, existing arrangements for international collective action — in 
particular the Kyoto Protocol — embody the key principles of a multilateral response and 
provide a good basis for future cooperation. The Review discusses flaws in the Kyoto 
                                                 
2 In addition to differences in the temporal and spatial scales on which they are effective, 
mitigation and adaptation differ in the extent to which their costs and benefits can be 
determined, compared and aggregated, and the actors and types of policies involved in their 
implementation (compared to adaptation, the number of sectors and actors involved in 
mitigation is limited). 
   




Protocol, but nevertheless concludes that the Protocol is a valuable starting point for 
international cooperation. The Review suggests that improvements could be made by: 
• expanding the time horizon by introducing a long-term timetable for emissions 
reductions 
• improving the mechanisms (such as the Clean Development Mechanism) through 
which developing countries participate, leading ultimately to these countries taking on 
binding commitments to reduce emissions 
• redesigning the compliance arrangements so as to encourage ongoing participation. 
Stern sees a global emissions price as the central element of international action and says 
that creating ‘a transparent and comparable carbon price signal around the world is an 
urgent challenge’ (Stern 2007c, p. 530). As discussed in section 6.2, the Review advocates 
establishing this price using emissions trading rather than a harmonised emissions tax. 
International aviation and shipping are identified as important targets for inclusion.  
While a global emissions price should be the central part of global action, Stern also sees a 
need for international action to extend to other elements of climate change policy. 
According to the Review, international technology cooperation will be worthwhile to 
ensure a diverse portfolio of research and development activities across the globe, and to 
address the global public good nature of research and development. Further, regulations 
and product standards on energy efficiency should be internationally coordinated to 
address barriers in markets for energy efficiency. Recognising the different dimensions of 
countries’ actions on climate change will also be important. For example, countries that 
make a disproportionately large contribution towards technological development should be 
recognised for this effort, even though it will not be possible to translate this into an 
equivalent amount of emissions reductions. 
The Review identifies forestry as an important sector that is not yet suitable for inclusion 
in the emissions pricing framework. There is more carbon presently locked up in forest 
ecosystems than in the atmosphere (IPCC 2001a) and preventing deforestation can be a 
highly cost-effective way of reducing GHG emissions. In the long-term, the inclusion of 
deforestation (and the planting of new forests) in carbon markets is seen as an effective 
way to support large-scale action. However, doing this too soon could destabilise carbon 
markets. In the interim, the Review says that alternative methods to discourage 
deforestation should be pursued, and the international community should compensate the 
(mainly developing) nations where the forests stand. 
Another area where the Review calls for international support for developing countries is 
adaptation. Stern says that: ‘the poorest developing countries will be hit earliest and 
hardest by climate change, even though they have contributed little to causing the problem’ 
(Stern 2007c, p. 622).  
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Participation and burden sharing 
The key challenge identified by the Review is to devise an agreement, or set of 
agreements, that attracts wide participation. Action on climate change has the potential to 
suffer from the ‘free rider’ problem: most individual countries are responsible for only a 
small share of total emissions, so their involvement in mitigation action will have little 
effect on total global emissions and, as such, they might be tempted to ‘free-ride’ on the 
efforts of other countries. To encourage wide participation, Stern advocates: 
• developing a shared understanding of the goals of action 
• aligning short-term goals, such as reduced air pollution, with long-term climate goals 
• ensuring the transparency and comparability of national action 
• careful design of compliance mechanisms 
• ensuring an equitable distribution of effort across developed and developing countries. 
With regard to the last point, the Review identifies a need for emission cuts across 
developed and developing countries because the scale of action necessary cannot be met by 
action in developed countries alone. For example, if developed countries reduce their 
emissions by 60 per cent from 1990 levels by 2050, action will still be needed in 
developing countries to reduce their growth in emissions to 25 per cent if the Review’s 
stabilisation target is to be met (figure ). 
The Review argues that developed countries should take a greater share of mitigation costs 
because of their greater ability to pay, responsibility for a greater share of historical 
emissions and higher per capita emissions. This is consistent with the UNFCCC principle 
of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. The Review suggests, as an illustration, 
that if mitigation costs are 1 per cent of global GDP, the richest 20 per cent of the world’s 
population might agree to pay 1.2 per cent of GDP, leaving the poorer 80 per cent of 
people to shoulder costs equivalent to 0.2 per cent of GDP. 
While equity is often deemed to require that developed countries pay a greater share of 
costs, efficiency demands that part of this will involve their taking responsibility for 
emissions reductions in developing countries. The Review states that ‘a major advantage of 
emissions trading schemes is that they enable efficiency and equity to be considered 
separately’ (Stern 2007c, p. 536). Through arrangements such as the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries can take responsibility 
for emissions reductions in developing countries that are cheaper than those available in 
their own countries. Stern says that the CDM has played a valuable role in building 
cooperation between developed and developing countries.  
   




Figure 6.2 Emissions reductions in developed and developing countries  
a This figure shows the change in GHG emissions for non-Annex 1 (developing) countries that would be 
consistent with meeting various stabilisation targets — assuming that Annex 1 (developed) countries took 
responsibility for cuts equal to 60 per cent of their 1990 emissions by 2050. 
Source: Stern (2007c, p. 520). 
Discussion 
The Review does not lay out a fully specified ‘blueprint’ for collective action on climate 
change, but rather discusses the issues and outlines some desirable features for an 
international framework. That said, there are some issues on which a position is taken that 
is contested by others. The Review identifies some commonly described faults of the 
Kyoto Protocol, but suggests building on this framework. Others argue that the Protocol’s 
faults are so serious we should start from scratch. Further, the Review argues that the post-
2012 international framework should be based around binding emissions caps for 
individual countries that: 
• are consistent with a long-term stabilisation target for atmospheric concentrations of 
GHGs  
• can be met in part through international trading in emission permits.  
There are at least three groups that disagree with this position. Those that: 
• believe it is unrealistic to insist on a nexus between country-based caps and a 
predetermined overall target (for example, Inquit 2007) 
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• say that international trading in permits is undesirable (for example, McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen 2006) 
• see an internationally harmonised tax on emissions as preferable to a cap-and-trade 
architecture (for example, Nordhaus 2006a). 
The issue that tends to dominate the geo-political debate, that of the treatment of 
developing countries, is singled out for a more detailed discussion below. 
How should developing countries be included in international agreements on 
climate change? 
Developing countries currently account for close to half of total global emissions of GHGs 
and the proportion is rising. Also, it has been reported that the majority of low cost 
abatement opportunities are in these countries (Enqvist, Naucler and Rosander 2007). 
Because of this, it is widely acknowledged (including by Stern) that broad participation by 
developing countries is essential for climate change mitigation to be effective and efficient. 
Developing countries’ participation was a major issue in past negotiations. Most 
developing countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol but are not required to take on 
binding emissions targets. Under the Protocol’s CDM, developed (Annex 1) countries may 
earn credits towards meeting their targets by implementing projects in developing 
countries.  
The nature of developing country involvement was one reason why the United States and 
Australia decided not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, the US Senate has 
unanimously passed the ‘Byrd-Hagel resolution’ (‘S. Res. 98’), which proclaims that ‘the 
United States should not be a signatory to any protocol … [which mandates] commitments 
to limit or reduce GHG emissions for the Annex I parties, unless the protocol … also 
mandates new specific scheduled commitments … for Developing Country parties within 
the same compliance period …’ (Müller 2005). 
From an economic perspective, approaches like the CDM are inferior to developing 
countries taking on binding commitments in two main ways. First, the CDM provides 
credit for emission reductions deemed to be beyond those expected under 
business-as-usual. Verifying such reductions is difficult, often costly and potentially open 
to gaming, because the business-as-usual baseline is hypothetical and so can not be 
established with any certainty. Second, the CDM does not internalise the cost of the GHG 
externality for firms and consumers in the host country or for goods exported from the 
country. Accordingly, the desired economywide emissions price signal is not achieved.  
The Review acknowledges these shortcomings and argues that, in the longer-term, 
developing countries must incorporate the externalities of using carbon into the structure of 
   




incentives in their own economies. However, it appears to support the continued use of the 
CDM for a considerable period of time. Indeed, ways to improve the CDM are discussed at 
some length.  
By contrast, some other analysts have suggested ways in which developing countries can 
adopt binding targets without this imposing large costs on them. Olmstead and Stavins 
(2006, p. 35), for example, state: 
On the one hand, for purposes of environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency, 
key developing countries should participate. On the other hand, for purposes of 
distributional equity (and international political pragmatism), they cannot be expected 
to incur the consequent costs. The answer is a set of ‘growth targets’ that are set 
initially at business-as-usual levels for respective developing countries, but become 
more stringent as those countries become more wealthy.  
Proposals of this type seem to have some potential for overcoming current political barriers 
to broader participation and improving policy effectiveness and efficiency. 
6.5 Summary 
The Review calls for strong, early action on mitigation so as to put the world on a path 
toward eventual stabilisation of atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at between 450 and 
550 ppm CO2e. Most other economic analysts conclude that mitigation efforts should start 
off at much more modest levels and intensify over time (the ‘policy ramp’). The policy 
ramp approach, as advocated by Nordhaus and others, implies less mitigation overall 
compared to the Review. There is, however, widespread agreement that some mitigation 
action should be taken now. 
According to the Review, the three essential elements of policy for mitigation are: 
• an emissions price, preferably equalised across countries, achieved through tax, trading 
or regulation (with countries possibly taking different approaches) 
• support for the development of a range of low-carbon technologies 
• removal of barriers to behavioural change, particularly to encourage the uptake of 
opportunities for energy efficiency. 
The Review tends not to be prescriptive about the choice of policy instruments, although it 
does support an international agreement being based on emissions trading, rather than 
emissions taxes. 
How best to establish the credibility of emissions pricing policy into the future is a key 
issue on which views differ. Without such credibility, firms are unlikely to take emissions 
prices fully into account in their long term investment decisions. The Review advocates 
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building credibility over time, and in the interim giving non-pricing policies a greater role 
than would otherwise be justified. Various other analysts have developed alternative 
strategies. Also, the Review’s conclusion that there are strong arguments for government 
support for the deployment of low emissions technologies is contested by others. 
The Review finds that preventing deforestation is often a low-cost means of reducing 
emissions. One way to create incentives for this is to allow credits for avoided 
deforestation in emissions trading markets, but Stern thinks that this could destabilise these 
markets.  
The Review argues that policies to facilitate adaptation to climate change are essential, but 
not a substitute for mitigation. 
The Review says that there are compelling reasons for developed countries to take on most 
of the costs associated with tackling climate change. This could involve these countries 
investing in emission reduction activities outside their own borders. The Review suggests 
improving the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM to facilitate this, but regards it as essential that 
developing countries eventually take on binding emission constraints. Some other analysts 
have suggested ways in which developing countries could take on binding emission 
commitments without incurring large costs. These proposals seem to have some 
advantages over continued use of the CDM. 
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A Discount rates 
There is a long standing debate on how to choose appropriate discount rates for 
public policy evaluation. One issue is how to deal with the fact that the resource 
costs of the policy may displace investment, current consumption or a combination 
of the two. More fundamentally, there is argument over whether a descriptive 
approach (that begins with evidence from decisions people make) or a prescriptive 
approach (that begins with ethical considerations) should be taken, particularly 
where long time horizons are involved. This appendix examines these debates and 
the implications for the choice of discount rates for use in analysing climate change.  
A.1 Investment and consumption sourcing 
If undertaking a project draws resources away from an alternative investment, the 
returns that could have been earned on this investment are an opportunity cost of 
proceeding with the project. In these circumstances the rate of return of the 
alternative investment (after adjusting for differences in risk), termed the 
opportunity cost of capital (OCC), is an appropriate discount rate to use for 
analysing the project.  
Alternatively, if the costs of a project displace current consumption, the future 
benefits should be at least high enough to compensate for the fact that people tend 
to prefer consumption sooner rather than later. That is, to voluntarily forgo a unit of 
consumption now, most people would require compensation of more than one unit 
of consumption in the future. Finding out just how much more allows peoples’ rate 
of time preference to be calculated. In these circumstances the discount rate for the 
project could be derived from the rates of time preference of members of the 
community. A rate of time preference (RTP) determined to be applicable for the 
community as a whole is sometimes termed a social rate of time preference 
(SRTP).1 
The OCC and the RTP will only be the same under very restrictive conditions, 
including perfect capital markets, no transaction costs and no distortionary taxes 
                                                 
1 The term ‘social rate of time preference’ is sometimes used to refer specifically to rates used 
under a prescriptive approach. The usage here is broader, relating to any consumer discount rate 
deemed appropriate for the whole community. 
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(Department of Finance 1991; Arnold and Sussman 1997). These conditions do not 
hold in practice and this tends to lead to the RTP being lower than the OCC 
(Cline 1992). Taxes on capital income are the main reason for the wedge between 
the two. 
Some proposed government projects and regulations involve costs that partly 
displace investment and partly displace current consumption (the associated benefits 
may also augment both investment and consumption). This complicates the choice 
of discount rate because of the existence of the wedge between the OCC and the 
RTP. This issue has received considerable attention in the social cost–benefit 
literature. One suggested solution is to use a weighted average of the OCC and the 
SRTP, with the weights determined according to the source of funds. 
Another approach is to value all resources in terms of consumption (that is, use 
consumption as the numeraire) and then discount using the SRTP (Arnold and 
Sussman 1997). Using this ‘consumption-equivalent technique’, costs and benefits 
that displace investment are multiplied by a shadow price of capital (that is greater 
than one) prior to discounting.2 Explanations of this technique can be found in Lind 
(1982) and Cline (1992). By applying a shadow price of capital, this approach to 
discounting indirectly takes the OCC into account (and accordingly the effective 
discount rate is higher than the SRTP used).3 
Australian governments often use discount rates based on the OCC in analysing 
proposed projects (DOFA 2006; Partnerships Victoria 2003). DOFA (2006) 
acknowledges that the consumption-equivalent technique is technically attractive, 
but points out its disadvantage in being a somewhat complex procedure. In 
explaining its preference for using the OCC it notes that this is a common 
international practice. 
Reasons why governments, in general, might prefer using discount rates for policy 
evaluation based on the OCC, rather than applying a shadow price of capital and 
discounting using the SRTP, include: 
• a view that the overall budget should be regarded as fixed, such that all projects 
can be considered to displace alternative projects and therefore have an 
opportunity cost of capital 
• a desire to limit the overall claim on resources by the public sector 
• to counter a perceived tendency for estimates of project costs and benefits not to 
be appropriately adjusted for downside risk 
                                                 
2 Under certain conditions the consumption-equivalent technique gives the same results as using 
the weighted average of the OCC and the SRTP.  
3 See Arrow et al. (1996) for a more detailed explanation. 
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• simplicity (as noted above). 
While many of these reasons may have validity in many cases,4 they do not 
necessarily apply to analysing climate change. Cline (1992, p. 237) argued: 
An important feature of discounting for greenhouse action is that in this area 
policy involves the raising of resources out of the general economy rather than 
the use of resources withdrawn primarily from either private investment or from 
alternative public-sector investments within a capital constrained budget. 
Further, while the argument for simplicity has practical appeal when applied to the 
thousands of relatively minor proposals whose evaluation requires application of a 
discount rate, it seems less relevant when applied to a large-scale global issue, such 
as climate change. 
Based on the arguments of Lind (1982), Cline (1992) used the 
consumption-equivalent technique to analyse climate change. Nordhaus (1994) also 
considers Lind (1982), but is unable to adapt the model he uses to the 
consumption-equivalent technique. The approach to discounting he takes is 
described as equivalent to Lind’s, with some exceptions (Nordhaus 1994).  
Like Cline, Stern takes a consumption-based approach. The analysis in the Review 
deals not with project costs and benefits, but with the modelling of the global 
economy: with and without climate change; and with and without greenhouse gas 
mitigation. This modelling produces estimates of consumption in each year. 
Accordingly, the shadow price of capital does not need to be applied explicitly, but 
rather the opportunity cost of any displaced investment should be taken into account 
within the modelling. 
Lind’s estimate for a SRTP that would be appropriate to use for the 
consumption-equivalent technique was 4.6 per cent per annum (based on the 
post-tax return on private assets). The very low discount rates used by Cline and 
Stern, therefore, are not explained by the use of this technique, but rather by them 
taking a prescriptive approach to deriving the SRTP, as discussed below.  
                                                 
4 This is not universally accepted. Arrow et al. (2005, p. 252) argue that when conducting 
cost-benefit analysis to evaluate environmental regulations the ‘rate at which future benefits and 
costs should be discounted to present values will generally not equal the rate of return on private 
investment. The discount rate should instead be based on how individuals trade off current for 
future consumption’. 
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A.2 Prescriptive versus descriptive approaches 
The ‘prescriptive’ approach to discounting involves taking an ethical perspective, 
based around asking ‘how (ethically) should impacts on future generations be 
valued?’ (Arrow et al 1996, p. 129). It attempts to deal with efficiency and equity 
issues simultaneously through the use of a social welfare function. The descriptive 
approach asks ‘what choices involving trade-offs across time do people actually 
make?’ (Arrow et al 1996, p. 129). It focuses on economic efficiency, leaving the 
contentious issue of equity to be considered separately. 
The descriptive approach is the conventional one and it is consistent with traditional 
cost–benefit analysis. It is widely favoured for short and medium term analyses. 
However, where intergenerational considerations are important, as they are with 
climate change, the issue of which approach to take remains unresolved (Ackerman 
and Finlayson 2006; Arrow et al. 1996). 
Advocates of the prescriptive approach regard market interest rates as unsatisfactory 
for use as discount rates in evaluating public policy. Part of the reason for this relate 
to the market distortions that lead the RTP to be lower than the OCC, as discussed 
above. Accordingly, the prescriptive approach generally utilises the 
consumption-equivalent technique. However, while this technique can still be based 
on market decisions (either by ‘backing out’ the distortions to arrive at a discount 
rate that is lower than, but still related to, the market interest rate, or empirical 
analysis of the discount rates underlying people’s consumption decisions), 
prescriptionists argue against this. This is because they believe that some features of 
people’s preferences imply that the SRTP will be lower than the average of 
individual RTPs, particularly over long timeframes. Beckerman and Hepburn (2007, 
pp. 203–4) list the following examples of those features: 
(i) social risk is invariably lower than individual’s risk 
(ii) many people may prefer, in their capacity as citizens, to discount the future less 
than they would do in making choices that affect only their personal allocation of 
resources …  
(iii) at best, markets only reflect individual preferences and growth expectations over 
relatively short periods of time. They provide little information about people’s 
preferences over generations. 
Advocates of the prescriptive approach often call for public debate on the ethics that 
should inform the selection of a discount rate and/or the use of techniques to obtain 
a representative estimate of social preferences. In this process, individuals 
proposing high discount rates, it is argued, would be making an explicit statement 
that they are unconcerned about the welfare of future generations.  
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Those who advocate a descriptive approach do not see the issue as being resolved 
through a debate on ethics. Rather they think discount rates should be determined 
largely from a consideration of the trade-offs across time that people actually make. 
This tends to focus attention on market interest rates (either pre-tax or post-tax as 
discussed below). The main danger they see from taking a prescriptive approach is 
that this would produce a low discount rate, resulting in economically inferior 
investments being undertaken. 
Deriving discount rates 
The derivation of discount rates using a prescriptive and descriptive approach is 
discussed below. 
Using a prescriptive approach 
A widely used approach to deriving the discount rate using a prescriptive approach 
involves the use of the following equation.5 
Rate of discount = δ + ηg    (equation 1) 
Where: δ is the rate of pure time preference (also called the utility discount rate); η 
is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption; and g is the growth rate of 
per capita consumption. The first two, δ and η, are ‘taste’ or ‘preference’ 
parameters, while g relates to technology (Weitzman 2007). Accordingly, there is 
no argument for being prescriptive about g — it should simply be forecast based on 
expectations (it is possible that g will be affected by climate change, however, and 
so there is an argument for making it endogenous to the modelling, as Stern does).  
Prescriptive choices for δ and η are usually based on ethical considerations. The 
Review sets δ close to zero (0.1) on ethical grounds, concluding that the welfare of 
future generations should be treated on a par with our own. However, the choice of 
η = 1 is not initially argued on ethical grounds, but rather is selected to be in line 
with recent empirical estimates. The ethical implication of this choice is that people 
derive the same utility from an additional one per cent of consumption, irrespective 
of their pre-existing level of consumption.  
Others who advocate taking a prescriptive approach make a case for different 
choices. Beckerman and Hepburn argue that attaching more importance to ones 
children and grandchildren than to generations more distant in time, is consistent 
                                                 
5 This approach models the relevant social welfare function as being that for an infinitely lived 
individual, with a specified utility function, in a Ramsey growth equilibrium. 
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with ethical theories that have ‘a distinguished pedigree going back to David Hume’ 
(Beckerman and Hepburn 2007, p. 198). Thus they believe that a case can be made 
for higher values for δ than that used by Stern. Arrow (1995) argues that setting δ at 
or close to zero demands very high savings rates and that this requires morally 
unacceptable sacrifices by current generations. To avoid this, his tentative 
conclusion is that δ should be about 1. 
Dasgupta agrees with setting δ close to zero, but regards η = 1 as ethically 
unattractive as it suggests that ‘the distribution of wellbeing among people doesn’t 
matter much’ (Dasgupta 2006, p. 7). He goes on to say that η = 3 is more in line 
with observed data.6 
As different ethical judgements are possible, a crucial question is how they should 
be reconciled. Stern’s suggestion is for there to be public debate: 
Different people will have different value judgements. But value judgements are not 
arbitrary. We can, and should discuss, which of the many possible value judgements 
have stronger call on our attention. We can cross-question ourselves and each other and 
bring appropriate evidence to bear. Such exercises will not remove ethical differences 
of view but they can help us understand, and often narrow differences. 
(Stern 2007d, p. 3) 
Beckerman and Hepburn (2007, p. 206) suggest that there exists a range of 
alternative approaches worth investigating ‘including the use of stated preference 
surveys, behavioural experiments, and methods to reveal the social preferences 
inherent in our institutions’. 
In either case the aim of the process would be to arrive at choices for δ and η that 
are, in some sense, representative of community views. It should be understood that 
no such process was undertaken for the Review. Accordingly, the Review’s 
estimates for aggregate damage costs from climate change are based on particular 
ethical judgements that are not, and are not claimed to be, representative of broader 
community views. 
Using a descriptive approach 
Taking a descriptive approach, the focus is on choosing the discount rate so that it is 
consistent with the relevant market data. If it is considered necessary, δ and η can 
then be chosen so that the right hand side of equation 1 equals this discount rate. As 
different combinations of δ and η will achieve this objective, a choice must be 
                                                 
6 Beckerman and Hepburn (2007, p. 194) note ‘A striking feature of this debate is that the 
arguments advanced for different values of η are a mix of the normative [prescriptive] and 
descriptive’. This observation is relevant to both Stern and Dasgupta. 
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made, even if it is arbitrary. For example, Nordhaus appears to choose a discount 
rate, then set η = 1 because it makes the modelling as simple as possible, and finally 
solves for δ (Quiggin 2006). 
Debate among advocates of the descriptive approach, therefore, centres on what the 
relevant market data are. Although somewhat dated, it is instructive to look at some 
of the data that Arrow et al. (1996) offered for consideration, included below in 
table A.1. 
Table A.1 Estimated returns on financial assets and direct investment 
Asset Period Real return (%)
High-income industrial countries   
 Equities 1960–84 5.4
 Bonds 1960–84 1.6
 Non-residential capital 1975–90 15.1
 Government short-term bonds 1960–90 0.3
  
United States  
 Equities 1925–92 6.5
 All private capital, pre-tax 1963–85 5.7
 Corporate capital, post-tax 1963–85 5.7
 Real estate 1960–84 5.5
 Farmland 1947–84 5.5
 Treasury bills 1926–86 0.3
  
Developing countries  
 Primary education various 26
 Higher education various 13
Source: Arrow et al. (1996, p. 133). 
As table A.1 shows, some people are willing to achieve a real return of between 
0 and 2 per cent per annum on low risk investments. However, returns on equities 
are generally much higher, often in the range of 5 to 7 per cent.7 
The position taken by Nordhaus, and some other advocates of the descriptive 
approach, is that the discount rate should be representative of the cost of capital to 
the economy as a whole (Nordhaus 1994). In determining what the cost of capital to 
the economy is, Nordhaus argues that the returns to low yielding assets, such as 
government bonds, should be ignored. This is because bonds ‘represent a special 
and unrepresentative asset that has risk characteristics quite different from those in 
either conventional investment or in slowing climate change’ (Nordhaus 1994, 
                                                 
7 Note that although average rates of return are observed, decisions are based on marginal rates of 
return. 
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p. 129). This view leads Nordhaus to use a discount rate that starts off at around 
6 per cent per annum. 
Some analysts have questioned this reasoning and argued that a risk-free discount 
rate may be more appropriate for analysing climate change (Cline 1992; 
Arrow 1995). Nordhaus’ argument against using a risk-free rate would seem to have 
generally prevailed amongst those that advocate a descriptive approach. However, 
Nordhaus’ position has been recently challenged by Weitzman (2007). 
In Weitzman’s view, ‘the biggest uncertainty of all in the economics of climate 
change is the uncertainty about which interest rate to use for discounting’ 
(Weitzman 2007, p. 3). This uncertainty stems from two factors. 
1. Uncertainty over whether climate change damages will be proportional to, or 
independent from, returns to the economy as a whole. Nordhaus assumes they 
will be proportional, but Weitzman argues that there are good reasons for 
thinking they will, to some extent, be independent. He cites the example of 
agriculture, which may be disproportionately impacted by climate change. 
Damages to this sector (and some others), he argues, may affect utility more or 
less independently of the rest of the aggregate economy. 
2. The fact that the difference between empirical values of the risk-free interest rate 
and the return on equity are much larger than predicted by theory (the equity 
premium puzzle). 
Weitzman argues: 
… that we are genuinely uncertain about what interest rate should be used to discount 
costs and benefits of climate changes a century from now brings discounting rates 
down from conventional values [of] 6-7% to much lower values of perhaps 2-4%. 
(Weitzman 2007, p. 27)  
Another challenge to conventional discounting has come from analysts that draw 
implications from the uncertainty surrounding market interest rates into the 
long-term future. Newell and Pizer (2001), for example, point out that few markets 
exist for assets with maturities exceeding 30 years, making the interest rate beyond 
that horizon uncertain. They show that if an uncertain random trajectory is assumed 
for future rates (based on historical data) the discount factor after 200 years can be 
many times higher than if a constant rate is assumed.8  
Newell and Pizer, and Weitzman, conclude that uncertainty over the right discount 
rate to use for the distant future is a reason for using lower discount rates (and 
                                                 
8 Costs and benefits in future years are multiplied by a discount factor that is less than one in 
order to convert them to present values. The higher the discount rate, the more steeply the 
discount factor declines. (The discount rate is the rate of decline of the discount factor.) 
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therefore higher discount factors) than if there was no uncertainty. This is perhaps 
counterintuitive as one might think that the uncertainties cancel each other out and 
that an average rate should be used. The reason this is not the case relates to the 
exponential effects of discounting — it is discount factors and not discount rates 
that need to be averaged (for a full explanation see Newell and Pizer 2001). 
For example, say there is uncertainty about whether to use a 3 or 8 per cent discount 
rate and that each is equally likely to be correct. A dollar received in one year’s time 
is either worth $1/1.03 = $0.97 or $1/1.08 = $0.93. The average is $0.95 (=1/1.054), 
which implies a discount rate of 5.4 percent, close to the average of 3 and 8. But a 
dollar received in 100 years’ time would be worth $0.05 (=$1/(1.03)^100) with a 
discount rate of 3 percent and $0.0005 (=$1/(1.08)^100)) at 8 percent, which 
averages to $0.03 ((=$1/(1.037)^100). The implied discount rate is 3.7 percent, 
much closer to 3 than to 8 percent. That is, if we are uncertain about which discount 
rate to use, the appropriate discount rate declines over time.  
As has been shown, a wide range of discount rates have been suggested as being 
appropriate under a descriptive approach. 
Critiquing the two approaches 
As might be expected, advocates of each approach generally regard the other 
approach as deficient. The reasons given for this are discussed below. 
Critique of the prescriptive approach 
The prescriptive approach to discounting has been criticised for a range of reasons, 
including the following. 
Being likely to lead to inferior investments being undertaken 
Those that advocate a descriptive approach to discounting point out that, regardless 
of the source of funds, undertaking an investment involves the use of scarce 
resources that could have been used for other purposes. Given that the prescriptive 
approach typically leads to low discount rates, it is argued that this will lead to the 
selection of inferior investments. For example, undertaking low-yielding 
climate-related investments at a time when some potentially high-yielding 
investments in education and health in developing countries are not being funded.  
   
102 THE STERN REVIEW: 




Requiring unreasonable levels of savings by current generations 
It has also been argued that low discount rates imply that current generations should 
save an unreasonably high proportion of income (Dasgupta 2006; Weitzman 2007). 
Weitzman, in discussing thought experiments based on Stern’s discounting 
parameters, concludes: 
For me (and I suspect most economists) sensible savings rates … require the rate of 
pure time preference to be significantly greater than zero (or at least if δ is chosen to be 
relatively small then η should be chosen to be relatively big). (Weitzman 2007, p. 8) 
Not being representative of community preferences 
The prescriptive approach is often seen as attempting to impose the ethical views of 
the analyst on a community that does not share those views. As has been discussed 
above, the prescriptive approach does not necessarily have to be applied in an 
unrepresentative way. However, the fact that it often is (including by Stern) gives 
legitimacy to this criticism. 
Mixing efficiency and equity issues when they are better addressed separately 
Unlike in traditional cost–benefit analysis, the prescriptive approach attempts to 
address efficiency and equity issues together. Economic efficiency has an explicit 
positive meaning and it can be estimated using economic techniques. Assessing 
equity, on the other hand, requires value judgements to be made — individual 
philosophers, economists and others have their own views, but these can differ 
significantly. Mixing the two concepts in cost–benefit analysis can prevent insights 
into efficiency from being gained and give a false sense of objectivity to the results.  
Some descriptionists argue that concerns over equity can be legitimate, but that they 
are best considered separately, rather than through adjusting the discount rate 
(Goulder and Stavins 2005). For example, if a cost–benefit analysis suggested that 
only modest levels of greenhouse gas mitigation were efficient in the near term, it 
could still be debated whether more should be done on intergenerational equity 
grounds. 
Being likely to be ineffectual in ameliorating perceived intergenerational inequity 
Taking a prescriptive approach to discounting can promote the adoption of public 
projects that have a net cost to current generations and produce benefits for future 
generations. Warr and Wright (1981), however, have shown that it can not be taken 
for granted that implementing such projects will result in overall improvements for 
future generations. This is because current generations may respond to these 
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government actions by reducing their private efforts (for example bequests) at 
improving the welfare of future generations. 
Critique of the descriptive approach 
The concept of potential Pareto improvement underlies the descriptive approach. To 
see this, consider a case where the discount rate reflects the opportunity cost of 
capital and a proposed policy for climate change mitigation fails the cost-benefit 
test. The reason it fails is that the winners from inaction (current generations) 
would, potentially, be able to invest an amount slightly less than the cost of 
mitigation that could be used to fully compensate the losers (future generations). 
The advocates of the prescriptive approach argue against the descriptive approach 
on the grounds that potential Pareto improvement is an unsuitable criteria where 
policy creates winners and losers between generations. Beckerman and Hepburn 
(2007, p. 189) articulate this case: 
It is generally accepted that although actual compensation is necessary, in principle, to 
ensure that any move is Pareto-optimising, this is invariably impossible in practice (and 
perhaps in theory as well), so that one must fall back on one or other of two defences of 
the [potential Pareto improvement criteria]. The first is that in a large society with lots 
of projects carried out, it can be assumed that losers on some projects are likely to be 
gainers on others. The second defence is that, anyway, the socially desired distribution 
of income in any democratic society is in the hands of the government and if, for one 
reason or another (including a bias in the projects selected), it is desirable to change the 
distribution, this can always be done via appropriate taxes and benefits. 
However, these defences are not available for climate change, where policy creates 
winners and losers between generations and intergenerational compensation is not 
possible. First, future generations that may benefit from any current policies cannot 
compensate those today who may bear the costs of the policy. Second, the swings and 
roundabouts argument cannot apply intergenerationally. Losers in the present 
generation have no hope of being winners in any subsequent generation. Thirdly, there 
is not, and can never be, any inter-temporal government that can adjust the 
intergenerational income distribution in accordance with any trans-generational views 
on what would be an equitable intergenerational distribution of welfare. 
Adopting a descriptive approach can be seen as answering the question: Is 
investment in climate change mitigation expected to produce higher returns than 
those available elsewhere in the economy? To those who advocate a prescriptive 
approach, this is the wrong question as investments in mitigation do not necessarily 
displace other investment. Instead they prefer to ask: Is investment in climate 
change mitigation expected to be welfare enhancing? Answering this question, it is 
argued, requires the use of a social welfare function constructed from ethical 
considerations, rather than the potential Pareto improvement criteria. 
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